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THE  EEC'S  TRADE  RELATIONS  WITH  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
INTRODUCTION 
THE  BACKGROUND  TO  NORTH-SOUTH  TRADE  TODAY 
This  study  deals with  the European  Community's  trade with  the  developing 
countries.  The  focus  is on  imports  because  the  aim is  to  see  how 
effectively  the  EEC  is using  trade  policy  to  promote  the  economic  develop-
ment  of  the  Third World.  The  assumption  that foreign  trade  is  a  key 
factor  in economic  growth is  one  of  the  constants  of  development policy 
since  the  early 1960s. 
The  General  Assembly  of  the  U.N.  adopted  in  1961  a  resolution entitled 
"International  trade  as  the  primary  instrument  of economic  development", 
and  the  first U.N.  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development,  which  gave  birth 
to  UNCTAD,  was  held  in 1964.  The  Final  Act  of  the  Conference  called 
on  the  international  community  "to  ensure  that all countries  - regardless 
of size,  of wealth,  of economic  and  social  system- enjoy  the benefits 
of  international  trade  for  their  economic  and  social progress." -2-
UNCTAD 
The  first  United Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and Development  (UNCTAD), 
held in  1964,  was  significant for  three reasons:  (1)  it was  attended 
by  120  countries - i.e.  virtually the entire U.N.  membership at that 
time;  (2)  it was  the  first to deal  with every aspect of international 
trade specifically  from  the  viewpoint of developing countries and in 
the context of their development needs and  (3)  it witnessed  the emer-
gence  of the Group of 77,  formed  by  the developing countries  from 
Asia,  Africa and Latin America. 
The  1964  Conference set the pattern  for  subsequent conferences,  which 
are held roughly  every  4  years.  It also created the institutional 
machinery which  enables  UNCTAD  to  function  between  conferences.  The 
UNCTAD  Secretariat,  based in Geneva,  has been closely identified with 
the developing countries  from  the very beginning.  Several  of the 
key proposals submitted by  the Group of 77  to  the  full  Conference 
were  drawn  up initially by  the Secretariat  - which,  incidentally,  has 
always  been headed by a  Third World personality. 
Dismissed by most  western nations as a  debating  forum  (its resolutions 
are not binding)  UNCTAD  still has  the active support of developing 
countries,  who  see it as both a  negotiating forum  and a  focal  point 
for  discussions  - and decisions  - on  the network of inter-related 
economic problems  facing  them as  they struggle to catch  up  with  the 
industrialized nations. 
L  __________________  j -3-
The  developing countries  have  been  the first to  insist on  "Trade,  not aid", 
although it could be  argued  that aid - financial,  technical,  managerial  -
is equally  important  for  economic  development. 
But what  is  the  contribution of international  trade  to  economic  development? 
Paradoxically,  no precise  answer  is possible.  The  experience  of  the last 
decade  suggests  that  development,  of which  growth  is  a  component,  is much  too 
complex  a  process  to  allow of simple  answers.  There  is  a  strong correlation, 
however,  between  economic  growth  (expressed  as  an  increase  in  the  Gross 
Domestic  Product)  and  the  level of exports:  most  developing countries with  a 
rapidly  expanding  GDP  can point  to high  growth  rates  for  their exports. 
This  has  led many  economists  to  advocate  export-led growth  for  the  developing 
countries.  Export  earnings  are  the main  source  of  finance  for  the  imports 
of machinery,  fertilizers,  transport  equipment  and other inputs  a  modern 
economy  requires.  According  to  a  senior World  Bank  official,  Shahid  Javed 
Burki,  "The potential of delivering real  resources  through  trade  is much 
greater  than  through  the  transfer of capital  through  concessional aid or 
commercial  loans." 
Developing  countries  need,  therefore,  to  raise  the  level  of  their exports  as 
much  as  possible.  But  most  of  them,  and  this is especially  true  of  the  65 
countries  linked  to  the EEC  through  the  successive  Lome  Conventions,  are 
heavily  dependent  on exports  of  one  or  two  commodities  at most.  As  connno-
dity prices  are highly volatile,  a  fall in export  earnings  can  have  an 
unfavourable effect on  the  economy  as  a  whole. 
As  agriculture  is  the  principal economic  activity for  most  Third World  coun-
tries,  it would  be  logical  for each  country  to  develop  exports  of  the agri-
cultural products it has  neglected  so  far.  But  there  is only  a  limited 
scope  for  such  diversification.  The  more  effective  form of diversification 
by  far is into manufactures,  based  on  locally produced agricultural  raw 
materials  to begin with. 
Developing countries would  then not only  escape  the  unfavourable  effects of 
volatile commodity  prices but also obtain better prices  for  their exports, 
which would  now  include  a  growing proportion of products with  considerably 
higher  added  value.  And,  most  important of all perhaps,  they would have 
set  their  economies  on  the  road  to  industrialization. -4-
If this strategy is  to  succeed,  the  industrialized countries must keep  their 
markets  open  to  developing countries'  exports of both  raw  materials  and  manu-
factures.  But while  they have  long  favoured  imports  of raw materials  and 
tropical products,  the  industrialized countries have  been reluctant  to 
encourage  imports  of manufactured  goods.  This  is clear from  the way  their 
import duties  are structured even  today:  the more  finished  the product  the 
higher  the  import duty.  In  the EEC  there  is no  import  duty on  raw  cotton 
but one  of  15%  on shirts. 
Even  so,  all industrialized countries have  recognized  the  need  to  help  the 
Third World  to  industrialize.  In  the early  1970s  they  conceded  the  demand 
for  a  system of  tariff preferences,  under which  Third World  exports  of 
manufactured products would be  exempt  from  import  duties.  The  EEC  was  the 
first  to  introduce  a  generalized system of preferences  in 1971  for  a  10-year 
period,  which was  extended  in 1981  for a  further  10  years. 
It is not  enough  to  grant tariff preferences,  however.  The  industrialized 
countries must  also be prepared  to accept  the reorganization of  their own 
industries,  and  in particular the modernization of  industries which  are still 
labour-intensive.  There  is  a  danger,  otherwise,  that  the benefits  under 
any  generalized system of preferences will be whittled  down,  or even with-
drawn. 
It probably  is equally  important  that developing  countries  keep  their own 
frontiers  open  to  imports,  subject to  (1)  the need  to  raise revenues  and 
(2)  protect infant industries.  By  exposing  domestic producers  to  interna-
tional competition  the  governments  of  developing countries  can  ensure  that 
production costs are held down,  thus  making it possible  for  their export 
industries  to  remain  competitive  on  international markets. 
Increased participation by  the  developing countries  in world  trade would 
benefit the  industrialized countries also.  Much  of  their export earnings 
would be  spent on  imports  of  the  inputs  needed  both  to generate additional 
earnings  and  to help raise living standards.  Greater international  trade, 
Constantine Machalopoulos,  a  director of  the World  Bank,  has  noted, 
encourages  competition,  improves  allocation of resources  and  fosters 
development. -5-
Such,  in broad outline,  is  the  argument  for  increased  trade between  the 
industrialized and  developing  countries.  Some  economists  have  referred  to 
the  strategy described  above  as  a  "win-win"  strategy because it benefits 
both  rich  and  poor  countries.  And  yet  from  the  very beginning  the  debates 
in UNCTAD,  the  one  U.N.  institution specifically set up  to  promote  Third 
World  development  through  trade,  have  been characterized by confrontation 
between developed  and  developing countries.  Relations between  them  have 
been more  constructive  in  GATT  but many  developing countries believe it has 
proved  largely ineffective in halting protectionist moves  by  the  industria-
lized countries,  especially when  they are  directed against Third World 
exports. -6-
GATT 
GATT  - the General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  - is both a  multi-
lateral  treaty embodying the  ground  rules  for  international  trade and  a 
forum in which  countries can  discuss  their trade problems,  settle 
disputes and negotiate the removal  of barriers to their external  trade. 
Its first principle is that trade must be conducted  on  the basis of non-
discrimination  - all  members  are  on  an  equal  basis,  whatever  the  volume 
of their  trade.  This  cardinal principle of GATT  is embodied in the 
most-favoured-nation clause. 
GATT  came  into  force  in  1948,  following  the breakdown of attempts  to set 
up an international  trade organization  (a  role which  VNCTAD  would like 
to play).  GATT  membership today stands at  90,  while a  further  31 
countries apply its rules on  a  de  facto basis.  Members  (contracting 
parties in GATT  jargon)  include several  East  European  countries but 
neither the Soviet  Union  nor China  (as  yet).  Even  so,  the  90  countries 
together account  for more  than  4/5 of world  trade. 
In  successive multilateral  trade negotiations in  GATT  the rules have been 
refined and obstacles  to  trade progressively reduced.  (However,  the 
Multifibres  Arrangement,  regulating imports  from  the  developing countries, 
was  also negotiated in  GATT).  The  most  comprehensive of these trade 
negotiations,  the  Tbkyo  Round,  lasted six years and produced important 
tariff reductions  as well  as  a  new series of agreements covering non-
tariff measures.  A  fresh  round,  which  eventually would cover trade in 
services also,  is currently  under discussion  in  Geneva,  where  the  GATT 
Secretariat is based. 
Developing countries now account  for more  than  2/3 of GATT  membership. 
For many  years  they have been  able  to apply certain of its rules with 
considerable flexibility.  Since  1965  their interests are covered by a 
chapter  - Part IV- on  trade and  development. -7-
Part of  the  explanation for  the "neglect" by  the  industrialized countries of 
•  •  •  i  the  trade  problems  of  developing countries is  to be  found  1n  the1r  relat1ve 
shares  1n world  trade.  In 1963  the  developing 
20%  of world exports;  in 1983  their share  stood 
countries  accounted for  some 
at 25%.  However,  if the 
oil-exporting countries are  excluded  their share would  remain  unchanged at 
15%.  From  the point of view of  the  industrialized countries  the  interna-
tional  community is devoting more  time  and  resources  to helping  the  Third 
World  solve  its  trade  problems  than is justified by its share of world  trade. 
International  trade has  always  generated  a  great deal of controversy,  of 
course.  It was  a  source  of hostility between nations  more  often  than  of 
cooperation  long before  the  North-South  dialogue  began.  It is not  simply 
journalistic exaggeration,  therefore,  which  turns  trade  disputes  into  trade 
wars.  The  17th century French  statesman Colbert  described  trade  as  the 
source  of  finance  and 
11finance  is  the  vital nerve  of war.
11  Not  surprisingly, 
therefore,  a  trade  surplus  is viewed with satisfaction and  a  deficit with 
concern,  even alarm,  and  can  lead countries  to  adopt beggar-my-neighbour 
policies. 
The  fact is  that economic  behaviour  is  rooted in self-interest.  The  econo-
mic  policy of any  government,  whether of  the  left or  the right,  is  conceived 
in a  national context and  is  aimed  at furthering  the national  interest. 
I 
It would be  absurd  to  expect  so  important  an  area of economic  policy as 
foreign  trade  to be  free  of nationalism.  The  British economist,  Joan 
Robinson,  has  noted  that classical economists  favoured  free  trade because it 
was  good  for Britain.  Trade  theory,  therefore,  may  be little more  than  the 
intellectual justification for policies  rooted  in nationalism. 
Economic  issues  can  arouse  strong feelings  in  the  general public,  especially 
if they relate  to  the  cost of living or  jobs.  In industrialized countries 
foreign  trade  is identified in the public mind,  especially in  times  of 
economic  crisis,  with  loss  of  jobs.  (It is much  more  difficult  to  get 
people  to  accept  the  opposite,  that international  trade creates  jobs.) 
Moreover,  it is  easier  to  restrict imports  than  to  ban  the  introduction of 
new  technology,  which  is  largely responsible for  the continued high  level 
of  unemployment  in  the EEC. -8-
The  reactions  to  foreign  trade  can be  equally emotive  in developing  coun-
tries.  Many  of  them firmly believe  that  trade was  used  during  the colonial 
period  to  plunder  them of their natural resources.  If  they  now  regard 
trade  as  a  key factor in their economic  development,  it is only on  condition 
that  the  rules  are  rewritten  to  favour  the  Third World.  Their  commitment 
to  a  new  international economic  order  therefore is emotional  as  much  as it 
is  economic  or political. 
It is necessary  to  keep  this aspect of North-South  trade  relations  in mind 
when  reading  the  rest of  this  paper.  The  measured prose of official 
speeches  can be  a  cloak  for  strong,  often contradictory,  emotions.  Even 
calls  for  international solidarity cannot  always  be  taken at face  value. 
PART  ONE:  THE  PATTERN  OF  NORTH-SOUTH  TRADE 
THE  NORTH  - THE  MAJOR  TRADING  POWERS 
In  the  following  pages  we  shall be  looking at  the  trade of  the  three major 
components  of  the  "North"  - the  United States,  Japan and  the  10-nation EEC. 
The  European  Community,  however,  is unlike  any  other regional  grouping  as 
regards  its objectives,  institutions  and  economic  importance.  But it is 
also  an  unfinished construction.  A few  words  about  the  EEC  itself may 
therefore be helpful. -9-
UNDERSTANDING  THE  EEC 
The  Community  is a  legal entity,  distinct  from its 10 member  states. 
It has sole responsibility  for  trade policy and  the operation of the 10-
nation  customs  union.  It represents  the  member  states in GATT,  for 
example.  Trade  agreements are negotiated by  the  European  Commission, 
on  the basis of negotiating directives  drawn  up by  the Council  of 
Ministers  on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission.  The  agreements  are 
approved by  the Council,  once  the  European  Parliament has been consulted. 
Responsibility for  running  the  Community is shared,  therefore,  among its 
three major institutions:  the  Council,  the  Commission  and  Parliament. 
Each  of the  three may  be  said  to represent,  and  ultimately defend,  a 
specific viewpoint:  the  Council  that of the member  governments,  the 
Commission  that of the  Community  as such  and  Parliament  that of its 
citizens.  A  fourth  institution,  the Court  of Justice,  deals  with  cases 
of alleged violation of Community  law. 
The  economic inspiration for  the  EEC  was  the  vision of a  large,  single 
market within which  there would  be  freedom of movement  for  both  goods 
and  the means  to produce  them,  including science and  technology. 
the blueprint had  to be adjusted  from  the  very beginning to  take 
of the diversity of national interests. 
But l 
accoun 
The  onset of the recession in the early  1970s  saw the member  states less 
willing to put Community  interests before their own.  The  fact  that  the 
first enlargement  virtually coincided with  the first oil  shock only added 
to  the problem of balancing often divergent national interests. 
In  the absence of a  strong economic recovery,  both within the  EEC  and 
world-wide,  the entry of Spain  and Portugal  could only heighten tensions 
within the  Community.  The  consequences  for world  trade of a  Community 
which is divided  and  unsure of itself is bound  to be unfavourable. -10-
The  following  Table  shows  the place  the EEC,  the United States  and  Japan 
occupy  in world  trade: 
TABLE  I 
How  the world's  major  trading powers 
(in billion U.S.  dollars 
EEC-10++ 
Total  trade  (exports  +  imports)  563 
Exports  as  % of world  exports  15 
as  % of  GDP  12 
Per capita exports  ($)  989 
++  The  figures  relate  to  extra-EEC  trade. 
compared  in  1983 
and  %) 
United States  Japan 
463  272 
11  8 
6  13 
837  1, 235 
Source:  SOEC,  Luxembourg,  and  Gatt,  International Trade,  1983/84 
Given  the membership of  the EEC,  the  place it occupies  in world  trade  is 
what  one  would expect.  With  two  exceptions  all  the  member  states have  very 
high per capita incomes.  The  EEC  is also  more  dependent  on  foreign  trade 
than  the  U.S.,  the other trading entity of  comparable  size.  The  extra-EEC 
exports  of Germany,  for  example,  represent  13%  of its GDP.  For  the U.K. 
the  corresponding  figure  is  12%,  for France  9%  and Belgium 18%. 
The  European  Community  is  a  major  trading partner  for  developing countries 
across  the  globe,  largely  for historic reasons.  Half its member  states are 
former  colonial powers,  who  had built up  an  extensive  trading relationship 
with  their overseas  possessions.  They  were  based on  the  import of  raw  . 
materials,  including tropical products,  and  the  export of manufactures. 
It is natural  to  assume  that  the EEC  is  the  largest market  for  the  developing 
conn tries.  But how  does  it compare  with other industrialized markets, 
notably  the American  and  Japanese? -II-
THE  MAJOR  TRADING  POWERS  AS  A MARKET  FOR  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
The  following  Table,  based on  the  trade statistics of  the  developing  coun-
tries  themselves,  shows  their exports  to  the major  trading powers  in  the 
North  as  a  percentage of  their total exports. 
TABLE  II 
Exports  of  develoEing  countries  to  the major  industrial 
markets,  1982  and  1983 
(as  a  percentage of  their total exports) 
EEC  United  States  JaEan  Comecon  + 
------ 1982--r983  1982  1983  1982  1983  1982  1983 
All developing 
countries  25  22  17  17  14  13  4  5 
Oil exporting 
countries  29  25  12  11  20  21  1  1 
Non-oil  export-
ing  countries  22  21  20  22  9  9  7  8 
Africa•  36  30  17  14  7  5  1  2 
Asia 
0  14  14  17  21  16  15  3  3 
Western 
hemisphere•  20  19  35  39  5  6  4  5 
+  includes  Cuba. 
0  excludes  oil exporting countries. 
I  Source:  IMF,  Direction of  Trade. 
The  Table  confirms  our earlier assumption  that  the  EEC  takes  the  largest 
share  of  developing  countries'  exports.  As  one  might  expect,  given  the 
Community's  dependence  on  imported oil and  the  current level  of oil price$, 
it takes  a  higher proportion of  the exports  of  the oil producing  developing 
countries  than  of  those without oil.  In  this  the  EEC  is like Japan  and 
unlike  the United States  and  the  Soviet Union. 
The  Table  also suggests  that developing countries  tend  to export  to  the 
industrial markets within  their region.  Thus  around  one-third of African 
exports  are  to  the  EEC  and  a  similar proportion of  Latin American  exports -12-
are  to  the U.S.  Asian exports  tend  to  go  in roughly  equal proportions  to 
the U.S.  and  Japan,  which is hardly surprising,  given  that several of  the 
most  dynamic  Asian exporters are  on  the  rim of  the Pacific ocean.  The  fact 
that  the EEC  is  the  major market for Africa has  been put forward at various 
times  in support of  the concept of Eurafrica as  a  natural  trading partnership. 
The  changes between  1982  and  1983  can be  ignored  for  the present,  partly 
because  a  2-year period hardly  allows  any  firm conclusions  to  be  reached, 
but  also because all  the  1983  statistics,  on  which  the  above  Table  is based, 
are provisional.  Calculations over  a  longer  time-period would  show  a  fall 
in  the  proportion of developing-country exports  going  to  the  industrialized 
countries.  Thus  in the early 1970s  the EEC's  share  in the exports  of 
developing countries was  around  one-third;  it is now  down  to one-quarter. 
The  U.S.  share has  also  declined,  although  that of Japan has  remained more  or 
less  stable. 
These  declines  reflect  to  some  extent a  growth  in South-South  trade.  But 
they  may  also reflect long-term structural changes  in  the pattern of North-
South  trade,  changes  which have been masked  by  the  rise in oil prices.  It 
is necessary, therefore,  to  look at the  contents of  developing  country exports 
to  the  major industrial markets. 
THE  IMPORTS  OF  THE  MAJOR  TRADING  POWERS  FROM  THE  SOUTH 
The  following  Table  shows  the  imports  of  the major  industrial nations  from 
the  developing countries: -13-
TABLE  Ill 
_!mports  of  the  Major  Tradi~g Powers  from  the  Develo:eing  Countries, 
1973  and  1982-83 
(in billion U.S.  dollars) 
~~ 
EEC  United States  Ja:ean  Comecon 
1973  1982  1983  1973  1982  1983  1973  1982  1983  1973  1982  1983  ---- ----
Primary  products,  34.1  104.0  85.8  13.8  65.2  60.0  13.9  69.2  63.3  4.3  18.1  17.5 
of which: 
Food  9.2  17.6  17.2  5.4  10.6  11.1  2.1  5.0  5.4  2.0 
Raw  materials  3.2  4.0  4.2  0.7  1.3  1.4  2.5  3.6  3.3  1.2 
Ores,  other 
minerals  1.8  3.5  3.2  0.8  1.4  1.2  1.8  3.6  3.4  0.3 
Fuels  17.8  76.4  58.4  6.5  50.2  44.0  6.7  55.4  49.5  0.5  4.9  4.5 
Manufactures  5.3  21.1  21.6  7.8  37.0  56.7  2.2  6.2  6.2  0.8  3.5  3.1 
of which: 
Semi-mfrs. 
+  1.1  2.5  2.6  1.0  2.7  3.7  0.6  0.8  0.8  0.1 
Engineering 
products,  0.9  6.2  6.7  2.6  15.6  20.4  0.3  1.1  1.3  0.1 
of which: 
Household 
appliances  0.3  1.7  1.6  0.8  3.3  4.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.01 
Textiles  and 
clothing  2.2  7.4  6.9  2.2  8.3  9.7  1.1  1.9  1.5  0.4 
Other  consumer 
products  0.5  2.9  3.0  1.4  8.1  9.0  0.2  0.8  0.8  0.1 
TOTAL  IMPORTS  39.5  125.8  108.1  22.0  103.7 107.4  16.2  75.9  69.9  5.1  21.5  20.6 
~·:  EEC-9  for  1973.  ...  not available 
+  Excluding  iron  and  steel,  chemicals 
Source:  GATT,  International  Trade,  1982/83  and  1983/84. Dl 
-14-
The  EEC  emerges  once  again as  the biggest importer of Third World  goods, 
although  in 1983 its imports were  only marginally higher  than  those of  the 
United States,  after being  20%  higher in 1982.  (Their per capita imports 
in 1983 were:  EEC- $394;  United States - $459  and Japan- $586.) 
Fuels,  essentially oil  and  gas,  account for  a  substantial part of  the 
imports  of all three  groups  of market  economies.  But  the proportion varies 
from one  group  to another.  Thus  in 1983  some  54%  of  the  Community's  imports 
from  the  developing countries  consisted of fuels  as  against  41%  for  the  U.S. 
and as  much  as  70%  for  Japan. 
The  importance  of manufacturing industry for  the  economic  development  of  the 
Third World  was  mentioned earlier.  As  long  as  the  emphasis  is  on  import 
substitution,  most of  the output is  aimed  at  the  domestic market.  But  in 
the  case of export-led  growth much  of it is  intended  for  overseas  markets, 
especially for countries with  small  domestic markets.  Developing  countries 
as  a  group  in fact maintain  that  they  should account  for  a  certain percentage 
of world  trade  in manufactures,  and  the  UNIDO  Conference  held in Lima  in 
1975  set this  figure  at 25%,  to  be  reached  by  the year 2000. 
As  the  above  Table  shows,  the U.S.  is  the  biggest market  for manufactures 
from  developing countries.  In 1983 its imports were  substantially larger 
than  those of  the  EEC.  That year manufactures  in fact accounted  for  as  much 
as  53%  of  total U.S.  imports  from  the  Third World,  as  compared  to  20%  for  the 
EEC,  16%  for  the  Comecon  and  9%  for  Japan.  What  is more,  engineering 
products  accounted  for  a  higher proportion of  U.S.  imports  than  textiles  and 
clothing,  both in absolute  terms  and  as  a  percentage of  total  imports  of 
manufactures.  The  U.S.,  in other words,  both  imports  more  manufactured 
products  from  the  Third World  than other industrial nations  and  imports  a 
wider  range  of  such products. 
HOW  IMPORTANT  IS  THE  SOUTH  FOR  THE  MAJOR  TRADING  POWERS? 
With  total imports  from  developing countries of  $108  billion in  1983  the  EEC 
remained  their major market  in the industrial world.  But what percentage 
of  the  Community's  total imports,  and especially of manufactures,  originate 
in the  developing countries,  as  compared  to  the  other  trading powers? -15-
The  ratio of  imports  from  developing countries  to  total imports  is shown  i~ 
the  following  Table  for  the  four  major industrial groupings: 
TABLE  IV 
~rts  of  the major  tradin!l Eowers  from  the 
developinjl countries,  1973  and  1982-83 
(as  a  % of  their total  imports  of  the  product 
in question) 
EEC><  United States  JaEan  Comecon 
1973  1982  1983  1973  1982  1983  1973  1982  1983  1973  1982  1983  ---- ---- ----
Primary 
products  55  59  55  51  64  61  44  67  66  23  26  25 
Food  44  48  51  52  53  53  29  30  32  23 
Raw  materials  29  25  27  21  24  21  38  39  39  31 
Ores  and  other 
minerals  38  38  36  42  47  42  41  46  45  20 
Fuels  89  71  65  70  74  73  80  84  84  17 
Manufactures  13  17  17  17  25  35  23  24  22  2  4  3 
Semi-mfrs. +  16  16  17  22  25  29  43  32  31  8 
Engineering 
products  5  10  10  10  18  21  7  12  12  0.2 
Household 
appliances  10  18  18  24  34  36  11  34  29  2 
Textiles  and 
clothing  41  49  46  55  71  71  61  55  so  12 
Other  consumer 
products  18  27  26  31  48  47  20  33  33  3 
TOTAL  IMPORTS  38  41  37  30  41  40  42  57  56  9  13  12 
;';  EEC-9  for  1973.  Percentages  calculated on basis extra-Community  trade. 
+  Excluding  iron  and  steel,  chemicals. 
Source:  Based  on  GATT,  International  Trade,  1982/83 and  1983/84. 
If intra-EEC  trade  is excluded,  imports  from  the  Third World  represented  37% 
of Community  imports  in 1983,  as  compared  to  40%  for  the  U.S.,  56%  for  Japan 
and  12%  for  the  Comecon  countries,  The  above  Table  confirms  what  the 
Community  has  always  known:  that a  high  proportion of its imports  originate -16-
in the  Third World,  even  though  Japan has  an  even higher ratio of  imports 
from  the  developing countries  (but as it is  the most  resource-poor of  the 
major  industrial powers,  this  is  to be  expected).  What  is more  unexpected, 
perhaps,  is  the  developing countries'  share  in  total U.S.  imports,  due  to 
its oil  imports. 
Table III showed  the U.S.  as  the  leading importer  among  industrialized 
countries  of  Third World  manufactures.  Table  IV  shows  that in 1983  the 
developing countries  supplied  some  35%  of its total imports,  as  against  17% 
for  the  EEC  and  22%  for Japan.  Even  in  the  case of  textiles  and  clothing, 
the  developing countries account  for as  much  as  70%  of  total U.S.  imports. 
Their share of EEC  imports,  although high,  is smaller  than it is in both 
the U.S.  and  Japan. 
A detailed analysis both of  trade  flows  and  trade policies  is needed  to 
explain the  differences mentioned  above.  But  Table  I  suggests  at least one 
explanation.  If imports  of oil and  gas  are left to  one  side,  Africa emerges 
as  the  Community's  largest supplier in  the  Third World,  whereas  Latin America 
followed by  Asia,  play  this role  in the case  of  the  U.S.  Africa is far 
less industrialized  than  the other  two  continents,  however,  so  that its 
exports consist in large  measure  of primary products,  including fuels  and 
tropical  foodstuffs.  The  EEC,  with its fewer natural resources  as  compared 
to  the U.S.,  is a  much  bigger  importer  of primary products,  as  Table III 
shows.  Finally,  and  this  is  a  point  to which we  shall be  returning later, 
it may  be  that  the  Community's  generalized system of preferences  (GSP)  is 
less effective in promoting  imports  of manufactures  from  the  Third World, 
especially of products  for which  they  are  the most  competitive but which  are 
deemed  "sensitive" by  the EEC. 
To  sum  up,  the EEC  remains  the  largest market for  the  Third World  in absolute 
terms,  followed  by  the U.S.  and  Japan,  with  the Comecon  countries well behind 
them.  This  is  the  case  as  regards not only oil but even agricultural 
products,  for which  developing countries  are  a  major supplier  to  the  Community. 
The  situation is somewhat  different,  however,  if one  looks at imports  of 
manufactures  by  the  major  industrialized countries.  The  principal market 
for  Third World  manufactures  is  the U.S.,  followed  by  the EEC. -17-
PART  TWO:  THE  PATTERN  OF  EEC-SOUTH  TRADE 
THE  OVERALL  PICTURE,  1973-1983 
The  Community's  prosperity rests  on  a  number of factors,  of which  the most 
important perhaps  are  the skills and  resourcefulness of its people.  But 
the  Community  owes  its high living standards  also  to  its far-flung network  of 
trading relations,  much  of it built up  during colonial  times.  The  nature 
of  this  relationship has  changed  considerably,  of course;  today  some  100 
developing countries  are  linked  to  the  EEC  through  cooperation agreements  of 
various kinds,  of which  the most well-known  is  the  Lome  Convention. 
Before  looking at  the  agreements  themselves  one  should  look at  the  trade 
flows  between  the  EEC  and its  trading partners  in the  Third World.  However, 
it is necessary  to  relate  these  flows  to  the  totality of  the  Community's 
international  trade,  so  that we  do  not  lose  sight of  the full picture. 
The  following  Table  contains  the  broad outlines  of  the  Community's  trade with 
both industrialized and  developing countries.  All  amounts  are  shown  in 
European  Currency Units  (ECUs),  rather  than  in U.S.  dollars because  the  ECU, 
being  a  basket unit,  based  on  a  certain quantity of each  Community  currency, 
reflects  more  accurately  trends  in the EEC's  foreign  trade. -18-
TABLE  V 
The  external  trade  of  the EEC,  1973,  1977  and  1981-83 
(in billion ECU  and  %) 
E  X P  0  R T S 
Destination  1973  1977  1981  1982  1983 
ECU  %  ECU  %  ECU  %  ECU  %  ECU  %  ---------- ---
Total  (Extra-EEC)  78.8  100  160.4  100  266.7  100  286.5  100  303.0  100 
Industrialized 
market  economies  48.4  61  83.1  52  134.8  so  149.5  52  162.9  54 
Developing 
countries  23.8  30  63.8  40  114.5  43  119.7  42  119.7  40 
Eastern Europe  6.6  9  13.5  8  17.3  7  17.3  6  20.4  6 
I  M P 0  R T S 
Ori~in 
Total  (Extra-EEC)  84.8 100  172.9  100  303.8  100  321.5  100  329.5  100 
Industrialized 
market  economies  45.8  54  82.9  48  149.9  49  163.6  51  175.6  53 
Develooing 
countries  33.0  39  77.3  45  131.6  43  131.5  41  125.5  38 
Eastern  Eurooe  6.1  7  12.6  7  22.3  7  26.3  8  28.4  9 
T R A D E  BALANCE 
Overall  -6.0  -12.5  -37.1  -35.0  -26.5 
With  industrialized 
market  economies  2.6  0.2  -15.1  -14.1  -12.7 
With  developing 
countries  -9.2  -13.5  -17.1  -11.8  - 5.8 
With Eastern 
Europe  0.5  0.9  - 5.0  - 9.0  - 8.0 
Source:  SOEC,  Luxembourg 
The  Third World  collectively is an  important  trading partner  for  the  Commu-
nity,  almost  as  important as  the  group  of industrialized market  economies. 
In recent years  the developing countries account for  roughly  40%  of  the 
EEC's  imports  and exports.  Of  course  there are  many  of  them,  so  that with 
the  exception of a  few  oil exporting countries,  individual  developing  coun-
tries provide  only a  minuscule  proportion of  the  Community's  imports. - 19-
The  following  Table  shows  the EEC's  imports  from  developing countries,  which 
have  been  grouped more  or  less  according  to how  they are  perceived by  the 
Community  as  trading partners.  The  Table  shows  imports  from  the  developing 
countries  1n  1973  and  1981  to  1983. 
TABLE  VI 
EEC  Is;>orts  from DeveloJ2in!1;  Countries, 
1973  and  1981-83 
(in billion ECU  and  %) 
1973  1981  1982  1983  ------ ECU  %  ECU  %  ECU  %  ECU  % 
Total  33.0  100  131.6  100  131.5  100  124.9  100 
of which: 
ACP  (63)  6.2  19  16.7  13  18.2  14  19.8  16 
Latin America  5.9  18  18.7  14  20.7  16  22.4  18 
Mediterranean 
Basin++  5.6  17  22.7  17  2 7 .o  21  2 7. 3  22 
OPEC  15.5  47  75.4  57  71.8  55  61.9  50 
Asia  (19)  _5. 4  16  20.8  16  22.5  17  25.0  20 
ASEAN  (5)  1.8  5  6.6  5  7.1  5  7.9  6 
Far Eastern 
Nics••  2.1  6  10.1  8  10.4  8  12.2  10 
In brackets,  number  of  countries  in group. 
++  Developing  countries only,  including Yugoslavia,  but excluding 
Israel. 
00  The  newly  industrializing countries  in  this  group  are  South Korea, 
Singapore,  Taiwan  and  Hong  Kong. 
If added  up  percentages will exceed  100.  This  is because  there  is a 
certain amount  of overlapping among  the various  country groupings. 
Thus  the Mediterranean Basin  group  includes  Libya and Algeria,  which  are 
also  included in OPEC.  Singapore  is  included in both  ASEAN  and  Far 
Eastern NICs. 
Source:  SOEC,  Luxembourg. 
As  a  group,  OPEC  has  always  been  the  Community's  main  trading partner amoag 
the developing countries,  reflecting  the EEC's  dependence  on  imported oil, 
But  its share  in  the EEC's  total Third World  imports  has  been declining ia 
recent years,  as  a  result of  lower oil prices,  the continued economic -20-
stagnation and  the  success  of  the Community's  efforts  to  conserve energy. 
(In 1973  oil and  gas  represented 63%  of  total  imports,  10 years  later 50%.) 
The  relatively high  level of  imports  from  the  ACP  countries  (16%  of  the  total 
in 1983)  owes  a  great deal  to  the  presence within  the  group  of Nigeria, 
another major oil-exporting country.  Without Nigeria  the ACP's  share  in 
EEC  imports would  fall  to  10%  in 1983.  But it must be  remembered  that  the 
group  also includes  a  score of  the world's  least developed countries,  whose 
contribution to  ACP/EEC  trade  flows  inevitably is very small. 
A comparison of  the categories "Asia"  and  "Far Eastern NICs"  suggests  that 
the  countries most active  in international  trade  are  the NICs.  During  the 
3-year period 1981-83  the  four  Far Eastern NICs  accounted for nearly half 
the Asian exports  to  the  Community.  Their exports  increased by  22%  during 
this  period,  as  against  16%  for  the  remaining countries  in  the  group  (and 
they  include  India and  China,  on  the one hand,  and  4  of  the  5  members  of 
ASEAN  on  the other). 
The  importance  of  the oil-exporting countries  and  the NICs  to  the EEC's 
import  trade  can be measured in yet another way.  In recent years  35 
countries  regularly account  for  around  85%  of  the Community's  total imports. 
Nineteen of  them are  developing countries.  In 1983  the first five  among 
the developing countries were  Saudi  Arabia  (7),  Libya  (10),  Nigeria  (11), 
Algeria  (12)  and  Iran  (13).  (Their rank on  the list of  35  countries is 
shown  in brackets.)  Also  on  the list were  Iraq  (19),  the United Arab 
Emirates  (21),  Venezuela  (22)  and Kuwait  (26).  These  nine  countries 
accounted  for  some  18%  of  the Community's  total  imports  from outside its 
frontiers  in 1983. 
The  other leading Third World  exporters  include Brazil  (in 14th place), 
Hong  Kong  (18),  Yugoslavia  (20),  Taiwan  (25),  Egypt  (27),  South Korea  (28), 
Mexico  (29),  China  (30),  India  (32)  and Malaysia  (33).  It will be  seen 
that all are either NICs  or semi-industrialized countries.  These  nine 
countries  together accounted for  just over  10%  of  the Community's  extra-EEC 
imports  in 1983.  (The  last  two  names  on  this list of  the  35  leading 
exporters  to  the  EEC  are Israel  and  Turkey.) 
The  role of  the oil-exporting countries,  the NICs  and  the  semi-industrialized 
countries  in  the  Community's  imports  is reflected in the  following  Table, -21-
which  shows  imports  from  developing  countries,  broken  down  into  the  SITC 
product groups. 
TABLE  VII 
EEC  Imports  from  Developing  Countries  by  SITC  Groups,  1983 
(in billion ECU) 
Total  (Extra-
EEC) 
Developing 
countries 
Mediterranean 
Basin 
OPEC 
Latin America 
ASEAN 
ACP  ( 63) 
Agricultural 
products 
0,  l'  4 
34.3 
19.2 
1.9 
l.l 
7.9 
2.5 
5.3 
Raw 
materials 
2 
30.2 
9.6 
1.3 
0.8 
3.0 
1.6 
2.6 
Fuel 
products 
3 
97.3 
66.1 
20.6 
57.0 
5.3 
0.1 
8.9 
Chemicals 
5 
16.2 
2.0 
0.8 
0.2 
0.3 
0.1 
0.5 
Manufactures 
6,  7'  8 
128.6 
25.3 
9.4 
1.6 
3.4 
3.2 
1.9 
The  above  Table  shows  both  the  strength and  weakness  of  the  OPEC  countries,: 
while  they provide  over  two-thirds  of  the  Community's  imports  of oil and  gas, 
their  share  in its imports  of manufactures,  including chemicals,  is negligi-
ble  as  yet.  A number  of Mediterranean  and  Latin American  countries  are 
doing  much  better in this  respect,  as  are countries  in Asia,  including India 
(1.3 billion ECUs  in 1983)  and  China  (1.3 billion ECUs).  As  a  group, 
developing countries  account  for  around  17%  of  the EEC's  total  imports  of 
manufactures  in recent years. 
Paradoxically,  they are  not major suppliers  of  raw  materials either:  in  19~3 
they  accounted  for  only one-third of  the  Community's  imports  from overseas. 
As  Table  VII  shows,  the Latin American  countries accounted  for nearly one-
third of  the  developing  countries'  exports,  followed  by  the  ACP  group. 
Both  groups  also had  a  major  share  in the  Community's  imports  of agricultural 
products.  But while  only  three countries  (Brazil,  Argentina  and  Colombia) 
supplied  three-fourths of  the  total  imports  from  Latin America,  imports  from 
the  ACP  countries were  spread over  a  much  larger number  of  suppliers. THE  NATURE  OF  THE  EEC'S  IMPORTS  FROM  THE  SOUTH 
What  are  the  Community's  main  imports  from  the  developing countries  (other 
than oil)?  And  how  has  the  composition of its imports varied in recent 
years? 
The  following  Table  lists the EEC's  principal  imports  from  the Third World  in 
1977,  1980  and  1983.  They  are  ranked in order of  importance  (on  the basis 
of  1983  imports). -23-
TABLE  VIII 
Trends  in the EEC' s  principal  imports  from  the  developin8 
countries  (excluding mineral  fuels) 
Value  (million ECU)  Market  share  (%)  Rank 
SITC  1977  1980  1983  1977  1980  1983  1977  1980  1983  --- ------
Total,  less  fuels  33,487  45,089  55,741  100.0  100.0  100.0 
07  Coffee,  tea, 
cocoa,  spices  6,836  5,579  6, 4 74  20.4  12.4  11.6  1  1  1 
84  Clothing  2,613  4,116  5,222  7.8  9.1  9.4  2  2  2 
05  Vegetables, 
fruits  2, 5 72  3,066  3, 974  7.7  6.8  7.1  3  4  3 
68  Non-ferrous 
metals  2,028  3,324  3,100  6.1  7.4  5.6  4  3  4 
28  Metalliferous 
ores  1, 9 74  2,784  3,033  5.9  6.2  5.4  5  5  5 
08  Animal  feeds  1,504  1,685  2,894  4.5  3.7  5.2  7  7  6 
65  Textiles  1,618  2,258  2,416  4.8  5.0  4.3  6  6  7 
89  Misc.  manfd. 
artie  les  639  1,237  1, 85 3  1.9  2.7  3.3  13  9  8 
24  Cork  & wood  1,107  1,574  1,574  3.3  3.5  2.8  8  8  9 
66  Non-metallic 
manufactures  737  872  1,373  2.2  1.9  2.5  11  12  10 
77  Electrical 
machinery  346  760  1,335  1.0  1.7  2.4  16  11 
76  Telecommunica-
tions  equip.  543  994  1,313  1.6  2.2  2.4  15  10  12 
26  Textile  fibres  857  772  1, 143  2.6  1.7  2.1  10  15  13 
42  Fixed vegetable 
oils  894  975  1,091  2.7  2.2  2.0  9  11  14 
03  Fish  392  628  1,000  1.2  1.4  1.8  17  15 
01  Meat  501  869  1.5  1.6  16 
12  Tobacco  443  569  866  1.3  1.3  1.6  17 
06  Sugar  707  870  808  2.1  1.9  1.4  12  13  18 
23  Crude  rubber  577  775  783  1.7  1.7  1.4  14  14  19 
71  Power  generating  740  1.3  20 
machinery 
indicates not  among  the  first  20  imports  for  that year 
Source:  SOEC,  Luxembourg -24-
What  these  figures  show  1s  that  the Community's  imports  from  the  Third World 
cover  a  very wide  range  of  products,  from  tropical beverages  and  industrial 
raw  materials  to  consumer  goods  and  industrial plant.  The  Community,  in 
other words,  is  a  market  for  every developing  country with goods  for export, 
whatever  its current level of  development.  It is the world's  largest 
importer  of  coffee  and  cocoa,  for  example,  and  the  second  largest  importer of 
bananas.  It is also a  major  importer of animal  feedstuffs. 
For historical reasons,  a  number  of  the  Community's  member  states have  an 
important  food  processing industry based on  imports  of  these  and  other 
tropical  products  and  raw materials.  However,  the  pressure of market  forces 
and  the  shift in emphasis  from  production  to marketing  in  the  EEC  has  led  to 
a  steady rise  in  imports  of products  in  their processed  forms.  In addition 
to  its imports  of cocoa beans,  for  example,  the  EEC  is also  the  leading 
importer  of  cocoa paste,  butter  and  powder. 
THE  CASE  OF  COCOA  AND  COTTON 
The  following  Tables  show  the EEC's  imports  of  cocoa beans,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  cocoa butter on  the other.  Given  the  relative stability in  the  demand 
for  cocoa,  the explanation of  the  fluctuations,  especially in the  shares  of 
individual exporting countries,  must  be  sought  in these  countries. 
TABLE  IX  l 
EEC  Imports  of  Cocoa  Bean  (SITC  072.1) 
(in million ECU) 
1977  1981  1982  1983 
Origin  ECU  %  ECU  %  ECU  %  ECU  % 
World  (Extra-EEC)  l,  198  100  1,021  100  1,128  100  1,040  100 
Ivory  Coast  258  22  341  33  355  32  292  28 
Nigeria  260  22  136  13  141  13  201  19 
Ghana  237  20  139  14  225  20  107  10 
Cameroon  131  ll  157  15  189  17  180  17 
Brazil  86  7  42  4  28  3  41  4 
l  Source:  SOEC,  Luxembourg 
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TABLE  X 
EEC  Imports  of Cocoa  Butter  (SITC  072.32) 
(in million ECU) 
Origin 
World  (Extra-EEC) 
Developing countries 
Ivory Coast 
Nigeria 
Ghana 
Cameroon 
Brazil 
1977 
Ecu-r 
218  100 
191  88 
20  9 
36  16 
66  30 
17  8 
36  17 
1981 
ECU  % 
169  100 
146  86 
22  13 
29  17 
32  19 
17  10 
29  17 
1982 
ECU  % 
205  100 
180  88 
26  18 
23  11 
35  17 
12  6 
60  29 
1983 
ECU  % 
213  100 
187  88 
25  12 
45  21 
25  12 
18  8 
55  26 
Source•  SOEC  Luxembourg 
L____ ___  ·-----------------------------------------------------------------------1 
That  the  EEC  should be  a  major  importer of clothing  from  the  developing 
countries  is hardly surprising;  that  this  item should  rank  second is more 
unexpected.  Equally  unexpected,  given  the  frequent  accusations of protec-
tionism levelled against  the EEC's  textile policy,  is  the  growth  in imports, 
which virtually doubled  between  1977  and  1983.  The  EEC  imports  substantial 
quantities  of  textiles also;  these  imports  ranked  seventh  in  importance  in 
1983,  having  risen by  some  50%  since  1977. 
While  the  EEC  is a  large-scale  importer of  textile  fibres  for its own 
industry,  cotton producers,  for  example,  can process  their raw material 
locally before  shipping it to  the  EEC.  It is interesting,  therefore,  to 
compare  the list of countries  exporting  raw  cotton with  those  exporting 
finished products.  The  following  Tables  allow just this. -26-
TABLE  XI 
EEC  I!!')2orts  of  Raw  Cotton  (SITC  263.1) 
(in mi 11 ion ECU) 
1977  1981  1982  1983 
Origin  ECU  %  ECU  %  ECU  %  ECU  % 
World  (Extra-EEC)  895  100  988  100  1,062  100  1,323  100 
Developing countries  539  60  479  48  515  48  802  60 
Egypt  38  4  75  8  84  8  141  11 
Syria  51  6  15  2  11  1  79  6 
Brazil  29  3  15  2  10  1  79  6 
Sudan  64  7  35  4  21  2  48  4 
Zimbabwe  36  4  43  4  44  3 
Paraguay  22  2  24  2  40  4  40  3 
Pakistan  33  4  6  1  10  1  27  2 
Chad  30  3  33  3  14  1  27  2 
Ivory Coast  16  2  18  2  15  2  19  1 
Source:  SOEC,  Luxembourg 
TABLE  XII 
EEC  I!!'l2orts  of Woven  Cotton Fabrics  (SITC  652) 
(in million ECU) 
1977  1981  1982  1983 
Origin  ECU  %  ECU  %  ECU  %  ECU  % 
World  (Extra-EEC)  930  100  1,051  100  1,231  100  1,349  100 
Developing  countries  394  42  399  38  462  38  521  39 
India  83  9  71  7  42  3  49  4 
Hong  Kong  48  5  58  6  55  5  74  5 
Pakistan  33  4  53  5  72  6  75  5 
Brazil  29  3  32  3  58  5  58  4 
Thailand  28  3  21  2  27  2  36  3 
Egypt  10  1  13  1  16  1  20  1 
Ivory Coast  8  1  14  1  15  1  18  1 
Chad  1  neg.  1  neg.  1  neg. 
Source:  SOEC,  Luxembourg  neg  =  negligible -27-
These  Tables  make  clear that  the  developing  countries  have  no  monopoly  on 
either  the  raw materials or  the  finished products  of  an  industry with which 
they  tend  to  be  identified.  The  U.S.  and  Soviet  Union  together account  for 
almost half world  cotton exports,  while  the  former  is also  a  major  textile 
exporter,  along with  Japan  and  several  EEC  countries. 
Among  developing  countries,  only Egypt may  be  said  to  have  an  important  share 
of  the  Community  market  for  raw cotton.  This  is also  true  as  regards  the 
market  for  cotton fabrics:  with  the  exception of Hong  Kong  and Pakistan,  most 
exporting countries have  only  a  small  share of it (but  they are  so  numerous 
that it was  necessary  to  limit  the  above  Tables  to  the  leading suppliers), 
The  fact  is  that most  exporters  of  raw  cotton are  also  exporting fabrics  to 
the Community;  this  is  true  not  only  of major producers  like Pakistan  and 
India but  also numerous  smaller  ones,  including Peru,  Colombia,  Argentina, 
Cameroon  and  Tanzania.  A surprising exception  is  the  Sudan,  which has  no 
exports  of cotton fabrics  to  the  EEC,  while  Egyptian exports  are negligible. 
On  the other hand,  a  major exporter of fabrics,  Hong  Kong,  is entirely 
dependent  on  imports  of  raw  cotton.  Its experience highlights,  in fact, 
the  role  of  entrepreneurs  in  the  process  of economic  development. 
THE  EEC 
1 S  EXPORTS  TO  THE  SOUTH 
The  importance  of  the EEC  as  a  market  for  Third World exports has  been  amply 
demonstrated.  In return,  the  developing countries  take  some  two-fifths of 
the  Community's  exports.  What  is more,  in  the  decade  between  1973  and  1983 
these  exports  rose by nearly  400%  (in  large part  the  result of determined 
efforts  to  recycle  the  flood  of  petrodollars),  as  compared  to  a  rise of  237% 
in Community  exports  to  the other industrial free market economies. 
what  does  the  EEC  sell in  the  Third World?  And  to  whom? 
However, -28-
TABLE  XIII 
EEC  Exports  to Developin!l  Countries, 
1973  and  1981-83 
(in billion ECU) 
1973  1981  1982  1983 
Destinations  ECU  %  ECU  %  ECU  %  ECU  % 
Total  (Extra-EEC)  23.8  100  114.5  100  119.7  100  119.7  100 
ACP  (63)  4.5  19  11.8  10  18.7  16  15.9  13 
Latin America  4.9  21  18.0  16  16.2  13  14.5  12 
Mediterranean Basin  6.6  28  17.6  15  20.2  17  22.3  19 
OPEC  6.7  29  53.5  47  55.6  46  52.1  43 
Asia  (19)  5.0  21  19.4  17  22.6  19  24.6  21 
A  SEAN  1.7  7  7.1  6  8.4  7  9.1 
Far East NICs  1.7  7  6.9  6  8.3  7  9.1 
Source:  SOEC,  Luxembourg. 
Taken  together,  the  oil-exporting countries  are not only  the  Community's 
principal  source  of  imports,  however  limited  their range,  but also its 
largest export market.  The  Asian  countries  come  next,  taking  roughly  one-
fifth of  the  Community's  exports  to  the Third World.  Within  this  group, 
ASEAN  and  the  Far Eastern NICs  form  two  very  dynamic  sub-groups.  In fact 
the  importance  of  the  Asian market  to  the  Community  would  stand out more 
sharply if the  two  oil  and  gas  exporting countries,  Algeria and  Libya,  were 
excluded  from  the  group  of Mediterranean Basin countries.  Without  them, 
the  group's  share  of  Community  exports would  fall  from  19%  to  10%  in  1983. 
The  ACP  countries  represent a  relatively small  market  for  the  EEC  in recent 
years.  This  no  doubt  is a  reflection of  the  economic  difficulties which 
many  countries  south  of  the  Sahara currently are  facing.  As  a  market,  the 
ACP  group is dominated  by  a  single  country,  Nigeria,  which alone  accounts 
for over one-third of  the  Community's  exports  to it.  However,  Nigeria's 
8 
8 
share  in EEC  exports  fell slightly in 1983,  as  a  result of  the measures  taken 
to  deal with  the country's  balance  of payments  problems. 
If  the  developing countries  are  an  important market  for  the  EEC  it is not 
simoly because  they  take  two-fifths  of its total exports.  As  the  following 
Table  shows,  around  85%  of  the  Community's  exports  to  them  consist of -29-
manufactured products  - i.e.  goods  with high value  added.  What  1s  more,  the 
developing  countries offer  the  only expanding market for  many  of  these  goods, 
whether  consumer  durables  or industrial plant.  As  an  Indian industrialist 
recently  asked  fellow  industrialists  from  the EEC  (at a  seminar on  technology 
transfers  sponsored by  the European  Collllllission)  ''Which  are  the  countries 
which  are still building steel works,  petrochemical plants,  industrial facto-
ries  and  power  stations  - and will still be  building  them into  the next 
century?" 
·------------
TABLE  XIV 
EEC  Exports  to  Developing  Countries_Ex Product  Groups 
(as  percentage of  total exports  to  them) 
1973  1981  1982  1983 
Total exports  100  100  100  100 
Primary products  15  17  16  15 
Food  11  12  11  10 
Manufactures  85  83  84  82 
Iron  and  steel  6  6  5  4 
Chemicals  15  11  12  13 
Engineering  products  50  52  54  50 
Textiles  and  clothing  5  3  3  3 
Other  consumer  goods  4  6  6  6 
Source:  Based on  GATT,  International Trade,  1982/83 and  1983/84. 
Two  dangers  threaten  the  Community's  exports  to  the  Third World,  one  apparent, 
the other real.  To  take  the  real first.  The  debt  burden for many  develop-
ing  countries  is  reaching  unmanageable  proportions.  Though  as  a  group 
these  countries  are  running  a  surplus  in their  trade with  the  Community,  many 
individual  countries  in fact have  a  deficit,  sometimes  a  chronic  deficit. 
Unfortunately it is far more  difficult for  developing countries  to  finance 
their deficits  than it is for  the  Community,  Hence  their tendency  to  cut 
back on  imports  to balance  their books,  or  to  try  to  link imports  to  exports 
through  counter-trade. 
The  apparent  threat is  that of  competition  from  developing  countries  for  many 
of  the  manufactured products which  the  EEC  exports  to  them.  It is  an -30-
apparent  threat because  competition is  the mainspring of  the international 
trading system and  recognized as  such by  the industrial nations  and  many 
developing  countries,  and  certainly by  the most  dynamic  among  them. 
PART  THREE: 
THE  EEC'S  TRADE  POLICIES  TOWARD  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
In Part II we  examined  the  level  and  composition of  the  Community's  imports 
from  the  Third World  in recent years.  Part III is devoted  to  an  examina-
tion  of  the  Community's  trade  policies  towards  the  developing countries. 
We  look at  the  forces  which have  shaped  these policies,  at their objectives 
and,  finally,  their effectiveness. 
DEVELOPMENTS  IN  THE  1960S 
POLICIES  TOWARDS  FORMER  COLONIES 
It is significant  that  the  6-nation EEC  was  founded,  like  the  Coal  and  Steel 
Community  before it, on  the assumption  that  an  outward-looking  trade  policy 
not only raises  living standards but also  draws  nations  closer  together. 
By  establishing a  Common  Market  the  Six hoped  to  raise living standards  more 
quickly  and  develop  closer relations between  the member  states.  During 
much  of  the  negotiations  over  the  Treaty of  Rome  the  focus  was  on  economic 
cooperation among  the Six,  which was  seen  as  a  means  of banishing  the  spectre 
of war  from Europe. 
It was  the  French who,  wanting  to maintain intact their  customs  un1on  with 
their  own  colonies  and  overseas  territories,  proposed  that provision be  made 
for  the  "overseas  countries  and  territories" of  the member  states.  This 
demand,  presented  toward  the end  of  the negotiations,  took  the others  by 
surprise.  It was  finally  agreed,  however,  to  "associate"  the  non-European 
countries  and  territories with  the  Community,  in order  "to  promote  their 
economic  and  social  development"  and  "establish close economic  relations 
between  them and  the  Community  as  a  whole."  A new  section, Part IV,  was 
added  to  the  Treaty of  Rome.  It set up  what  amounted  in practice  to  a  free 
trade  area  between  the  Community  and  the  individual colonies  and overseas 
territories  of member  states. -31-
By  1962  the  process  of  decolonization  had overtaken French-speaking Africa 
also.  As  a  result,  Part  IV  was  replaced in  1964  by  the  Yaounde  Convention 
of Association,  which  was  concluded  for  a  5-year period between  the EEC  and 
18  sovereign,  independent  African  states.  The  tariff preferences which 
they  had been  granted  under Part  IV  were  now  incorporated into  a  legally 
binding contract between  the  Six,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Eighteen on  the 
other.  What  had  once  been  a  unilateral decision of  the  Six was  now  a 
Treaty  between  sovereign  states. 
The  concept of association  (which  included development  aid,  given  through  a 
special European  Development  Fund  created in 1959)  was  the earliest and  by 
far  the  most  important strand in  the  Community's  policy  toward  developing 
countries.  We  shall  return  to it later,  however.  Although  the first 
Yaounde  Convention was  followed  by  the  second,  signed in  1969,  its re-
negotiation in 1973/75  took  place  under  very  different circumstances.  Some 
21  developing  Commonwealth  countries  in Africa,  the  Caribbean  and  the Pacific 
took  part  in  them  and  the  outcome  was  the  much  more  comprehensive  Lome 
Convention.  At  their  demand  the  term "association" was  dropped.  This  was 
a  significant change  in political  terms  and  reflected  the  changing  relation-
ship between  the  EEC  and  the  "associated" states,  the  ACP  group,  as  the 
associated states  are  now  commonly  described.  (Habits  die hard,  however. 
Even  today  the  conntries  of Asia  and  Latin America  are  the  "non-associated" 
I 
developing  countries  in EEC  jargon.) 
TOWARD  THE  MEDITERRANEAN  COUNTRIES 
A second  strand  in the EEC's  trade policies  toward  the  developing countries 
was  provided by  the need  for  a  policy  toward  the  Mediterranean  countries. 
Here  again  the  starting point was  France's  desire  to  maintain  its  preferen-
tial  trade  relations with  Tunisia  and  Morocco.  But  the EEC  found it more 
difficult  to  define  its policy  toward  these  and  the other developing 
Mediterranean countries.  Their physical proximity  to  Europe,  their  long 
historical  association with  southern  Europe,  their  close  economic  ties with 
the  Mediterranean regions  of  the EEC  entitled them  to  a  special relationship 
with  the  Community.  The  EEC  recognized  this:  the  trade  agreements  concluded 
with  Tunisia  and  Morocco  in  1969  envisaged  the  creation of a  free  trade  area. 
But it was  only in the  early  1970s  that a  Community  policy embracing all  7 
countries of  the  Arab  Mashreq  and  Maghreb  began  to  take  shape;  and it was  not 
until  1976  that  the  first cooperation  agreements  with  them were  signed. -32-
A discussion of  these  agreements  must  be  deferred,  therefore,  until  our 
examination of  the  development  of  Community  policies  in the  1970s. 
TOWARD  OTHER  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
The  third strand of  trade  policy  is not  always  a  separate strand.  If the 
Treaty of  Rome  made  provisions  for  the  Community's  relations with  the 
"overseas  countries  and  territories
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,  it contained  no  references  to  the  rest 
of  the  Third World.  Relations  with  the other developing  countries,  as 
with  the  developed,  would be  governed by  the  common  commercial  policy,  by 
means  of which  the  EEC  hoped  to  contribute "to  the  progressive abolition of 
restrictions  on  international  trade".  The  Community,  in other  words, 
envisaged  the  reduction of  its  tariffs  on  imports  from  the  "non-associated" 
developing countries also,  but  in a  global,  multilateral context  - through 
trade negotiations  in the  GATT,  for  example. 
During  the  1961/63 negotiations  for Britain's entry,  the  EEC  was  compelled 
briefly  to  envisage  future  arrangements  between  the  enlarged  Community  and 
the  developing members  of  the  Commonwealth.  But with  the collapse of  these 
negotiations  the need  for  such  arrangements  disappeared.  However,  through 
its participation in such  international  fora  as  GATT  and  UNCTAD  the  EEC  was 
obliged  to  define its position on  a  wide  range  of  issues  raised by  the  Third 
World. 
One  of  the most  important of  these,  from  the developing countries'  point of 
view,  was  their demand  for  a  generalized  system of preferences  (GSP).  It 
was  raised by  the developing  countries  as  a  group  during  the  first United 
Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and Development  (UNCTAD)  in 1964  (which witnessed 
the  creation of  the  Group  of  77). 
The  theoretical  justification for  the  GSP  was  provided by  the Argentinian 
economist  Raul  Prebisch in a  Report which  he  drew  up  for  UNCTAD  I.  He 
argued  that developing  countries needed  to  free  themselves  from  their 
dependence  on  trade  in primary  products,  which  is characterized by  slow 
long-term growth  and price instability.  To  do  this  they  had  to  develop 
their exports  to  the  industrialized countries of manufactured  goods,  demand 
for  which was  stronger  and  which  offered substantially higher export 
earnings. -33-
However,  Third  World manufacturers  could not  compete  successfully with pro-
ducers  in  the  industrialized countries  unaided.  Hence  the need  for  a 
system under which  Third  World  exporters would  pay  custom duties  at substan-
tially lower- i.e. preferential- rates  than  their competitors.  The  EEC, 
together with  the other industrialized countries,  accepted  the  need  for  the 
developing  countries  to  industrialize;  they  agreed  that  the  process  of 
industrialization required,  in its initial stages,  at any  rate,  that  the 
industrialized countries  encourage  imports  of  semi-manufactured  and  manu-
factured  products  from  the  Third World.  But  they  took  the  view  that it 
would be better  to  reduce  tariffs on all such  imports,  whatever  their origin, 
through multilateral negotiations. 
developing  and  developed nations. 
World  trade would  rise,  benefiting both 
The  fact  that  the  demand  for  a  generalized  system of  preferences  coincided 
with  the start of  the  first major  round of multilateral  trade  negotiations 
in GATT,  the  Kennedy  Round,  only  added  to  the  reluctance  of  the  industria-
lized countries  to  consider  the  GSP.  They  felt  that  the  tariff cutting 
process  under way  in GATT  would be  unfavourably  affected if there  were 
simultaneous  discussions with  the  developing  countries  over  the  partial  -
or even  total  - suspension  of  tariffs on  their exports  to  the  industrialized 
countries.  Certainly  the  developing  countries would  be  strongly  tempted 
to  withdraw  from  the  Kennedy  Round  and  concentrate  their efforts  on  securing 
the  GSP. 
It was  almost  10  years  before  a  system of tariff preferences  was  finally 
introduced,  with  the  EEC  taking  the  lead.  This  was  not surprising,  for 
it had  played  a  key part in  the  debates  in UNCTAD.  The  Community's  own 
system came  into  force  in 1971.  In  1973  the  U.K.,  Ireland  and  Denmark 
scrapped  their own  national  systems  and  adopted  the  Community's  on  joining 
the  EEC. -34-
THE  GENERALIZED  SYSTEM  OF  PREFERENCES  (GSP) 
The  aim of the  GSP  is to  foster  the industrialization of the developing coun-
tries by making it easier  for  them  to  export their send-manufactured and 
manufactured products  to  the industrialized countries.  Exports  under  the  GS 
enter  the markets of these countries either duty-free or at  lower  - i.e. pre-
ferential  - rates of duty.  As  tariffs on  products of export interest to 
developing countries  tend to be relatively high,  the  GSP  provides  Third  World 
exporters  a  price advantage over exporters  from  industrialized countries. 
Some  20  OECD  countries currently grant preferences  to developing countries 
under  the  GSP.  The  EEC  was  the  first  to  do  so;  its scheme  came  into force 
in  1971  for  a  10-year period and  was  extended  for  a  further  10  years in  1980. 
Product  and  country coverage,  as  well  as  the margin of preference,  vary  from 
one  donor  country  to another.  The  EEC's  scheme covers all semi-manufactured 
and  manufactured products including textiles and Clothing  (Chapters  25  to  99 
of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature),  as well as  a  large number of processed 
agricultural products  (Chapters  1  to  24).  All industrial products and  over 
20%  of agricultural products enter duty-free;  there are tariff reductions of 
20%  to  60%  for  other agricultural products. 
Some  127 independent countries and  22  dependent  territories of the member 
states are beneficiaries of the  Community's  scheme.  Their  GSP  exports  to 
the  EEC  were  originally limited by means of global  quotas and ceilings, which 
beneficiary countries could utilize on  a  first-come,  first-served basis,  sub-
ject to certain  limits.  The  global  quotas have now been  replaced by indivi-
dual  quota  amounts,  which has strengthened the hand of exporters in their 
negotiations with importers. 
The  least developed countries enjoy additional  benefits:  duty-free entry  for 
all agricultural products covered by  the  GSP  and  duty-free and  quota-free 
entry  for  all industrial products,  including textiles. 
Some  samples of preferential rates are shown  below. 
munity's  1984  scheme: 
They  relate to the  Com-
Product  MFN  rate of duty 
Hand  tools  (CCT  82.04)  5.1% 
woven  fabrics  of man-
made  fibres  (CCT  56.07A)  11.8% 
Cocoa  powder,  unsweet-
ened  (CCT  18.05)  16% 
Preferential  rate 
0%  duty  for  an  individual benefi-
ciary country ceiling of ECU 
7,998,100 
0%  duty  for  varying quantities, 
ranging  from  5  to  1,789.1  tonnes, 
for  each of 22  countries with 
whom  the  EEC  has  a  textile agree-
ment 
9% -35-
DEVELOPMENTS  IN  THE  1970S 
The  First Enlargement:  Providin~or the  Developing  Commonwealth 
Britain's projected entry  gave  fresh  impetus  to  the  debate which  had  already 
begun  in  the  6-nation EEC  over its role  in promoting  economic  development 
in  the  Third World.  Britain presented  the  Community  with much  the  same 
problem as  France  had  done  some  15  years before.  Although  Commcnwealth 
preferences  had  given way  to  the  UNCTAD-inspired  Generalized  System of 
Preferences,  the  U.K.,  no  less  than  the  independent  developing  members  of 
the  Commonwealth,  was  concerned  that  the  enlargement of  the  EEC  should not 
damage  their  trade  interests. 
The  21  developing countries  in Africa,  the  Caribbean  and  the  Pacific were 
accordingly  glven  the opportunity  to  join  the  18  associated  states  in 
negotiating  a  successor  to  the  second Yaounde  Convention  of Association. 
At  the  same  time  the  Commonwealth  Sugar Agreement was  allowed  to  run until 
1975,  when it was  replaced by  the  Sugar Protocol  of  the  Lome  Convention  and 
extended  to  cover  imports  from all ACP  countries.  As  for  the  developing 
Commonwealth  countries  in Asia,  a  Joint Declaration of Intent committed  the 
enlarged  Connnuni ty  to  examine  with  them  "such  problems  as  may  arise  in  the 
field of  trade  with  a  view  to  seeking  appropriate  solutions .
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The  Lome  Conventions 
The  Lome  Conventions,  the  third of which was  signed in December,  1984, 
represent  the highwater mark  of  the EEC's  policies  toward  developing  coun-
tries,  and  the  fullest expression of its belief  that  trade  concessions  are 
inadequate by  themselves.  Here  we  are  concerned  only with  the  trade 
provisions  of  the  Conventions:  two  of  their  most  innovative  features  (Stabex 
and  Sysmin)  come  within  the  category of  development  aid.  (The  description 
of  the  trade  provisions which  follows  relates mainly  to  the first and  second 
Conventions,  although  some  of  the  improvements  under  Lome  III are  referred 
to.) 
Given  that  the  number  of beneficiary countries was  to  be  more  than  doubled, 
it would  have  come  as  no  surprise had  the  enlarged  Community  expressed in 
1974  a  desire  to  reduce  the  duty-free  access  extended  under  the Yaounde  Con-
ven tion.  In fact  the  ACP  countries have  been granted free  access  from  the 
very beginning  for  as  much  as  99.5%  of  their exports.  Only  products -36-
covered by  the  common  agricultural policy have  been excluded  from duty-free 
and  quota-free  treatment.  However,  even as  regards  these products  the  ACP 
countries  enjoy more  favourable  terms  than other developing countries.  For 
example,  exports of beef  and  veal  (a major  item  for  Botswana)  enter  the EEC 
duty-free  and  only  10%  of  the variable  levies are  charged. 
The  enlarged  Community  also undertook  to  help  producers  of  sugar,  rum, 
bananas  and  rice.  The  Sugar  Protocol,  annexed  to  the  Lorn€  Conventions,  was 
concluded  for  an indefinite period.  It provides  for  the  supply by  the  ACP 
countries  of  1,400,000  tonnes  of  raw  sugar a  year  and its purchase by  the 
EEC  at a  guaranteed price,  which  is virtually linked  to  the prices paid  to 
Community  producers.  Under  the  Rum  Protocol  the  Caribbean countries  enjoy 
duty-free  quotas  for  what  is  an  important  export for  many  of  them. 
An  important  feature  of  successive  Lome  Conventions  has  been  the  chapter  on 
Trade  Promotion.  Under  its provisions  the  ACP  countries  are  given both 
technical  and  financial  help  for  a  variety of purposes,  including not only 
market  research  and  advertising but also  the  training of personnel,  product 
identification and  development,  participation in trade  fairs  and  exhibitions, 
etc.  The  aim,  as  set out  in Lome  II,  is to  help  the  ACP  countries  (1) 
derive maximum  benefit  from  the  provisions of  the  Convention and  (2)  diversify 
the  range  and  increase  the value  and  volume  of  their exports  to  the  Community 
as  well  as  to  domestic,  regional  and  international  markets. 
The  ACP  countries,  like many  others  in  the developing world,  are major 
exporters  of primary  products.  However,  in a  stagnant  market  price  increases 
for  primary  commodities  are  likely  to  occur only when  there  are  shortfalls in 
production,  due  either  to  natural  calamities  or  industrial  action.  It there-
fore  is in the interest of producers  to process  their  raw materials  locally, 
either for  export or  the  domestic market. 
A number  of  import-substitution industries  - food  processing,  tobacco, 
textiles  - were  set up  in  some  African  countries  before  decolonization. 
Between  1960  and  1975  there was  a  fresh attempt at industrialization,  this 
time  through  the  public  sector. 
Through  successive  Lome  Conventions  the  EEC  and  ACP  countries have  recognized 
the  pressing need  to  promote  the  industrial development of  the  latter.  The 
Conventions  have  sought  to  promote  "new  relations of  dynamic  complementarity -37-
in  the industrial field between  the  Community  and  the  ACP  states" and  the 
"development  and  diversification of all types  of  industry  in the  ACP  states." 
To  reach  these  objectives  the  EEC  has  extended  financial  and  technical  help 
in the  fields  of  industrial  training,  the  local processing  of  raw materials, 
the  transfer of  technology,  the  development  of industrial  infrastructures, 
energy  cooperation  and  industrial  information  and  promotion. 
The  Mediterranean Agreements 
The  1970s  also witnessed  a  more  dynamic  approach  to  the  countries  of  the 
Mediterranean basin.  It was  as  if the  Community  had  suddenly  awoken  to  the 
realization  that  the  southern Mediterranean  was  an  extension of Europe  and 
that its  economic  development  was  a  concDmitant  to  its own.  While  only  too 
aware  of  the  conflict of  interests  in agricultural  production  and  trade,  the 
EEC  nevertheless  decided at  the  1972  Paris  summit meeting  to negotiate  coope-
ration  agreements  with  the Mediterranean  countries,  on  the basis of  a 
balanced,  global  approach  in which  trade  concessions,  economic  cooperation 
and  technical  and  financial  aid would  form  an  integrated whole. 
Between  1975  and  1977  the  EEC  concluded cooperation agreements  with  the  seven 
countries  of  the  Mashreq  and  Maghreb  and  Israel.  The  agreement with Israel 
provided  for  the  creation of  a  free  trade  area,  thus  reflecting  the  simila-
rities between  their economies.  The  other  agreements,  although differing 
in detail,  were  all cast in the  same  mould. 
Their  trade  provisions  include  duty-free  and,  in principle,  quota-free  entry 
into  the  EEC  for all manufactured products,  except  refined petroleum products 
and  certain textiles.  This  concession has  not  been  extended  as  fully  to 
agricultural exports,  simply because  a  number  of  them,  notably citrus fruit, 
tomatoes,  olive oil  and  wine  compete  with  the  Community's  own  production. 
The  tariff reductions vary,  therefore,  between  20%  and  100%,  while  exports 
of certain products  are  subject  to  quotas  and  can be  exported only at certain 
times  of  the year. 
Thus  the  55%  tariff reduction on fruit  salad is  for  a  quota of  100  tonnes  a 
year;  the  30%  tariff reduction on  tomato  concentrate was  similarly for  a 
fixed  amount.  (The  major exporter,  Morocco,  has  preferred  to  pay  the  full 
tariff.)  The  preferential rate of  duty  for brans  and  sharps  (used mainly 
for  animal  fodder)  is applied only if exports  are at  the  EEC's  minimum  entry 
price. -38-
These  concessions have  been made  on  a  non-reciprocal basis,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  ACP  countries,  and  for  an indefinite period.  However,  the  financial 
protocols  annexed  to  each  agreement,  are  for  five years  (and were  renewed  in 
1981).  The  fact  that all  seven agreements  should have  been concluded  for 
an  indefinite period  is a  clear indication of  the political importance  the 
EEC  attaches  to  its economic  relations with  them.  Another  indication is 
the  provision for  the  Cooperation Council,  set up  under  each agreement,  to 
meet at ministerial  level.  Of  all  the other cooperation agreements,  only 
the  Lome  Convention provides  for meetings at so  high  a  political level. 
Commercial  cooperation with  the 
11non-associated" 
developing  countries 
With Britain's entry  into  the EEC  the  enlarged  Community  had  to  decide  on 
the  arrangements  to  be  concluded with  the developing  Commonwealth  countries 
in Asia.  Association had been  ruled out  during  the  1961/63 negotiations. 
Now  the  introduction of  the  GSP  seemed  to  take care of  the  problem of access 
for  their exports,  certainly of  industrial products.  And  the  Community  as 
such clearly was  in no  position to  take  on  the  burden of  financial  aid  to 
countries  as  populous  as  India. 
The  Joint Declaration of  Intent,  annexed  to  the  Treaty of Accession,  under-
took  to  examine with  the  independent,  developing members  of  the  Commonwealth 
(and,  eventually,  with their neighbours  in southeast Asia)  "such problems  as 
may  arise in the  field of  trade with  a  view  to  seeking appropriate  solutions." 
India was  the first country  to  take  advantage  of  this offer.  During  the 
early 1960s  it had wanted  to  conclude  a  formal  trade agreement with  the  EEC 
but had  met with no  response.  The  JDI  opened  the way  for  an agreement. 
With  the  introduction of  the  GSP  there was  less  need  for  tariff concessions. 
A preferential  agreement,  such as  Lome  I,  could be  ruled out,  therefore. 
In any  case,  as  both India and  the  member  states of  the  EEC  were  contracting 
parties  to  the Gatt,  tariff reductions  on  products  not  covered by  the  GSP 
could be  dealt with  in  the  context of multilateral  trade relations.  Mean-
while,  India would  automatically benefit from  the reductions  to  the  Commu-
nity's tariffs resulting  from  the  Tokyo  Round  of  trade negotiations  in the 
Gatt. -39-
It was  logical,  therefore,  that  the projected agreement with  India provide 
for most-favoured-nation  treatment  for  the exports of both India and  the EEC. 
For  the rest,  the  two  sides  concentrated on how  they might act jointly to 
increase  their  two-way  trade.  As  a  result,  the S-year,  non-preferential 
commercial  cooperation agreement  concluded  in 1973  contained  no  new  tariff 
concessions but  provided  for  the  EEC  and  India  to  cooperate with each  other  -
through  exchanges  of  trade  delegations,  for  example  - in raising their  two-
way  trade. 
Commercial  cooperation agreements  were  concluded with Pakistan,  Bangladesh 
and  Sri  Lanka.  The  EEC  offered  to  conclude  a  similar agreement with  the 
5-nation regional  grouping  in Southeast Asia,  ASEAN,  but  the latter felt a 
Joint Study  Group  to  be  adequate  for  the  time being. 
India  took  the  initiative  in 1978  in seeking  to  expand  the  scope of its 1973 
agreement.  This  agreement  encouraged  cooperation between  Indian and  Euro-
pean enterprises  in the industrial  sector,  provided it was  linked  to  trade, 
so  as  to  remain within the  Community's  competence.  But  India now  wanted 
co-operation  to  be  extended  across  the  entire  range  of  economic  endeavour. 
The  present EEC/India  agreement  lists several activities  aimed  at bringing 
together  economic  operators  from  both sides.  They  include visits by  trade 
and  industrial delegations;  participation in trade  fairs  and  exhibitions  by 
Indian firms;  the  promotion of private  investments;  cooperation between 
Indian and  European  trade  and  economic  organizations;  technological  and 
scientific cooperation,  including joint research programmes,  notably in the 
fields  of energy  and energy-related  technology  and  environment protection. 
Since  1980  the  Community  has  entered into cooperation agreements with several 
"non-associated"  developing  countries.  They  are  more  comprehensive  in scope 
than  those  concluded  in  the  1970s  and  contain provisions  for  development 
cooperation also  to be  financed  out of  funds  made  available by  the  EEC  for 
the  "non-associated''  developing  countries  as  a  group.  The  latest of  these 
agreements  is with Pakistan and  is  the first  to be  described  as  a  "commercial, 
economic  and  development  cooperation agreement."  Other  commercial  and 
economic  cooperation agreements  have  been concluded  in recent years with 
ASEAN,  Brazil,  the  Andean  Pact  group  and  the People's  Republic  of  China. -40-
The  Euro-Arab  Dialogue 
The  1970s  also witnessed another  development  of great potential  importance 
to  the  Community's  trade  policy.  This  was  OPEC's  decision in 1973  to  raise 
oil prices  four-fold.  To  the  economic  impact of  this unexpected move  was 
added  the  political and  psychological  shock of  the  Arab  oil embargo.  At 
their December,  1973,  summit  meeting  the EEC  heads  of  state or  government 
reaffirmed  the  "great  importance"  they attached "to opening negotiations 
with  the oil producers  on overall  arrangements,  including a  wide  range of 
cooperation  •.•  "  As  it would  have  been impolitic,  and  no  doubt  fruitless, 
to  address  the Organization of Arab  Oil Exporting Countries  (OAPEC)  directly, 
the  Community  addressed itself to  the Arab  League,  thus  launching  the  Euro-
Arab  Dialogue. 
The  EEC's  economic  objectives have  been clear from  the start.  They  are  to 
ensure  stability in the  Community's  oil supplies  and,  if possible,  in prices, 
and  a  high  level of exports  to  the  Arab  countries  in order  to  hold down  the 
oil-related trade deficit  to manageable  levels.  Given  that many  of its 
exports consist of  equipment  for  the oil and  petrochemical  industries,  the 
EEC  h~s felt  some  concern over  the  impact  on  its  own  industries  of  this new, 
and eventually very substantial,  increase in production capacity in  the oil 
producing developing countries. 
The  contents of  the  Euro-Arab  Dialogue  reflect  these  concerns.  The  Joint 
Memorandum  adopted  in 1975  described  the  economic  aims  of  the Dialogue  to be 
the  establishment of  the  conditions  necessary  for  the  development of  the 
Arab  World  and  the  lessening of  the  technology gap  separating Arab  and 
European countries.  To  this end,  the Memorandum  noted,  effective measures 
were  necessary in all domains,  based on an equitable division of labour 
between  the  two  groups. 
Following Egypt's exclusion from  the Arab  League  in 1979,  the Dialogue was 
suspended  at  the  League's  request.  Although it was  resumed  in 1981, 
progress has  been  slow,  partly because of  the variety and  complexity of  the 
problems,  political as  well  as  economic,  the  Dialogue must  deal with. -41-
COMPREHENSIVE  POLICIES  FOR  THE  1980S 
It is clear  from  the  foregoing  that the EEC's  trade  policy  toward  the  Third 
World  has  developed  in much  the  same  way  as  that of other  trading nations: 
by fits  and  starts and  more  often than not  in response  to  specific problems. 
Until  the moment  of Britain's entry its focus  was  Africa.  After  1973 it 
was  necessary  to extend  the  network  of  formal  trade relations  to  the 
developing  Commonwealth  and,  later,  for  reasons  of balance,  to Latin America. 
Currently  the  Community  is  trying  to  see what  readjustments  the  entry of 
Spain and  Portugal will necessitate,  especially to  its Mediterranean policy. 
The  EEC  has  also  taken  an  active part  in the work  of  international  trade 
fora,  notably Gatt and  UNCTAD.  It can  even be  argued  that during  the  1960s 
and  1970s,  while  the  developing countries were  pressing for  a  global  approach 
to  development,  the  EEC  was  already  applying it, first  through  the Yaounde 
Convention,  and  later  through  the  Lome  Convention,  to which  over half  the 
members  of  the  Group  of  77  are  now  signatories. 
Because of  this  the  Community  has  always  regarded itself as  a  pace-setter in 
relations with  the  developing world.  At  the  same  time  it has  offered  to 
join forces with  the other  industrialized countries  in helping  the  Third 
World  as  a  whole.  Thus  even while  implementing  the provisions of  the Lome 
Convention relating  to  commodities,  the  EEC  has  actively  supported  the  UNCTAD 
Integrated Programme  for  Commodities  and  its related Common  Fund,  just as  ~n 
the  1960s  it backed  the  demand  for  generalized tariff preferences  for all 
developing  countries  and  was  the first  to  introduce  a  system open  to  all  the 
members  of  the  Group  of  77. 
The  fact is  that  the  EEC  can claim today  to  have  developed  the widest  range 
of  instruments  for  helping  developing countries  raise their  living  standards 
through  increased  trade,  on  the  one  hand,  and  development  aid  on  the  other. 
As  we  have  seen,  these  instruments  include preferential  trade  agreements 
(which  have  been concluded with no  fewer  than  75  countries,  including  27  of 
the  least developed)  as well  as  commercial  and  economic  cooperation agree-
ments,  several of which  have  been  concluded with  the world's most  populous 
countries,  notably  India,  China,  Indonesia  and  Brazil.  The  EEC  also  finan-
ces  a  variety of  trade  promotion  programmes  for  developing  countries.  At 
the  same  time  it participates  in  the various  international  commodity  agree-
ments  and other  international activities aimed at promoting  North-South 
trade. -~-
PART  FOUR: 
EFFECTIVENESS  AND  LIMITATIONS  OF  THE  EEC'S  TRADE  POLICIES 
SOME  GENERAL  LIMITATIONS 
The  EEC  uses  a  wide  range  of  instruments  to  promote  trade with  developing 
countries.  But how  effective have  they  proved?  Have  they  actually 
resulted in higher exports  to  the  Community? 
A fall  in exports  cannot be  taken as  a  sign of  the  ineffectiveness of  the 
measures  in question,  of course.  Tariff preferences,  experience has  shown, 
are  not  enough  in  themselves.  The  exporting  country must  have  a  surplus  for 
export,  or at least be  in a  position to  increase production sufficiently to 
generate a  surplus.  What  is more,  its prices must  be  competitive when 
compared  to  those of other suppliers,  and  it must  know  how  to market its 
products.  In other words,  whether exports  rise or fall  depends  as  much  on 
measures  taken  in the exporting  country as  the  concessions  extended by  the 
importing country. 
The  level  of exports  depends  also on  the  level  of  economic  activity in gene-
ral.  Clearly at a  time  of  economic  recession  demand  for  industrial  raw 
materials will  fall off.  So  will  demand  for  tea  and  coffee,  as  unemployment 
rises  and purchasing  power  declines.  The  last 10  years  have  not been 
especially favourable  to  an  increase  in world  trade.  Hence  the  argument, 
put  forward  by  several Western  leaders  in recent  years,  that  the best way  in 
which  the  industrialized nations  can help  just now  is by  getting their own 
economies  moving  forward  again. 
In  the  following pages  we  shall  try  to  see how  far  the various  Community 
instruments  have benefited  the  developing countries.  We  shall be  looking 
for  a  rise in exports  to  the  Community,  of course;  but also  for  a  diversity 
in the  products  exported,  especially  for  a  shift from  raw materials  to  semi-
finished  and  finished  goods. 
THE  LOME  CONVENTION 
Between  1973  and  1983  the EEC's  imports  from  the  ACP  countries  rose by  220% 
while  the  increase in imports  from  the  developing  countries  as  a  group was 
280%.  Even without  the  exports  of  OPEC  the developing countries as  a  group 
still managed  an  increase of  260%.  What  is more,  the  ACP  share  in  the -~-
This  is borne out as  regards  cocoa,  for  example,  of which  the  EEC  is  the 
leading  importer.  The  ACP  share  of both  the world  and  EEC  markets  has 
fallen in recent years,  largely because  production has  declined in  two  major 
producing countries,  Ghana  and Nigeria,  The  Ivory Coast,  the world's 
leading producer,  and  Cameroon  have  done  relatively well,  on  the other hand. 
(In 1983/84 production in the  Ivory Coast  rose by  13%,  partly because of more 
favourable  weather conditions.) 
But it will be difficult for  Nigeria  and  Ghana  to  recover  lost ground  and 
for  the others  to  raise  their exports  even further.  The  fact is  that con-
sumption is  stagnant  and  is unlikely  to rise in  the  industrialized countries. 
The  ACP  countries,  who  account  for  about  65%  of world production of cocoa 
beans, will have  to  fight  among  themselves  and  against other developing 
countries  to  increase  their market  share.  This  is already  happening  as 
regards  coffee,  where  Latin American  producers,  who  account  for  about  two-
thirds of world exports,  are marketing  aggressively  to  increase  their share 
of  a  declining market. 
But  successive Lome  Conventions  have  aimed at helping  the  ACP  countries 
process  raw materials  locally and  increase  the  ratio of manufactured products 
to  primary  commodities  in  their exports.  In  1983  their exports of manufac-
tures  amounted  to  ECU  2.4 billion and  represented  some  10%  of  total EEC 
imports  from  developing  countries.  The  situation is perhaps  less  encoura-
ging  as  regards  the manufactured products  nearly all  developing  countries 
begin by  exporting  - textiles,  clothing,  footwear  and  plywood. 
The  ACP  countries account  for  under  4%  of  the  EEC's  total  imports  of  plywood, 
including veneered  panels  and  sheets.  The  lion's  share of this  is  supplied 
by  Gabon.  Textile yarn  and  thread are  exported by  seven ACP  countries but 
the quantities are marginal  - around 5,000  tonnes  in all  (1%  of  total EEC 
imports).  The  situation is  similar as  regards  cotton fabrics  and  clothing, 
with  even  the major  ACP  exporters -e.g.  the Ivory  Coast  for cotton fabrics 
and Mauritius  for clothing - ranking  far behind other developing exporting 
countries.  Senegal  is virtually alone  in exporting  footwear but its market 
share  is negligible. 
The  Lome  Convention has  had  little impact,  therefore,  on  ACP  exports  of manu-
factured products.  Were  the  Asian countries  to  enjoy  terms  similar  to  those 
extended  to  the  ACP  group,  the results almost  certainly would  be  very differ--44-
Community's  total  imports  from  the  Third World fell by  19%  to  16%  over  the 
same  10-year period, 
At  first sight,  therefore,  the Lome  Convention does  not  seem  to have helped 
ACP  countries  in their efforts  to  develop  their exports.  But all generali-
zations  regarding  the  ACP  are  of  limited value.  The  differences between 
the  64  countries  that make  up  the  group  are  so  large  that a  valid assessment 
of  the effects of  the  Lome  Convention on exports must be  on  the basis of  sub-
groups at the very least.  Nigeria,  inevitably,  dominates  the  group.  It 
alone  accounts  for over  40%  of  the  total  GNP  of  the  64  countries;  and  thanks 
to its oil  income,  its per capita GNP  is more  than  twice  the  ACP  median. 
The  seven  largest ACP  economies  together account  for  two-thirds  of  the  total 
GNP  of  the  group. 
Their  growth  rates vary greatly.  In  the  decade  between  1970  and  1980  seven 
of  the  43  African countries  in  the  group  recorded an average  annual  rate of 
growth  of over  4%  in real  GNP  per head,  But  even within this  group  there 
are considerable  differences.  Among  the  seven are  Nigeria  and  Gabon,  both 
large-scale exporters of primary products;  Mauritius,  with  a  population of 
one million and heavily dependent  on its sugar exports;  Rwanda,  with  a  per 
capita  GNP  of  $200  and Botswana,  which  contains most of  the Kalahari  desert. 
However,  24  of  the  43  African countries  saw  their real per capita  GNP  decline 
over  the  1970s, 
Given  this great diversity within  the  ACP  group,  it is evident  that one  should 
look at the  trade of  individual countries  to  find out how  effective  the Lome 
Convention has  proved in raising their exports,  For all practical purposes 
this means  looking at a  handful  of  countries  - notably Nigeria,  the  Ivory 
Coast,  Zaire,  Cameroon  and  Zambia.  One  can also  look at the major exports 
of  the  ACP  as  a  group.  Three  commodities  dominate  ACP  exports  to  the  Commu-
nity.  They  are oil,  coffee  and  cocoa. 
Now  oil is a  "special" case in that the oil exporting  developing  countries 
operate  a  cartel which  sets both prices  and output - although with only  limited 
success  in recent years  because of  the glut in supplies  on  the world market. 
The  situation is  somewhat  similar as  regards  coffee and  cocoa  in that  trade 
in both  commodities  is governed by  international agreements.  However,  in 
all  three  cases market  forces  seem  to be  the decisive  factor,  so  that the 
ultimate responsibility for  raising exports  lies with  the producing countries. -45-
ent.  This  suggests  that countries must  be  in a  position to  take  advantage 
of benefits  extended  them.  Many  experts believe  that if a  country is  to 
operate  a  modern  industry profitably it must  have  a  population of  10 million 
at least,  Only  a  dozen  ACP  countries meet  this  requirement. 
Mauritius  has  shown  that  the  handicap  of  a  small  domestic  market  can be 
offset by  producing  for world markets,  although it remains  true  that  a  large 
home  market  can make  it easier for  domestic manufacturers  to  compete  abroad. 
But  in order  to  develop  export-oriented  industries  most  ACP  countries,  even 
more  than  countries  in Asia  and  Latin America,  need  foreign  investments, 
know-how  and  managerial  skills.  While  the  Lome  Convention  encourages  the 
transfer of all  three  to  the  ACP  countries,  the  fact  remains  that European 
manufacturers willing  to  invest  in Third World  countries  generally want  to 
produce  for  the  local market.  Those  wanting  to  take  advantage of  low  wages 
to manufacture  for  the  European market have  shown  a  disinclination to  set up 
plants  in black Africa. 
A large  number  of  ACP  countries  seem  badly handicapped  in the  on-going race 
among  Third World  countries  to  develop  exports  of manufactured  goods  to  the 
industrialized markets.  Their  trump  card  - duty-free  and  quota-free  access 
to  the  important  EEC  market  - clearly is not  enough.  For many  Asian  coun-
tries,  for  example,  EEC  tariffs on  industrial products  are  far  less  of  a 
hurdle  than EEC  quotas  - and  the  threat of  such  quotas. 
Have  the EEC's  rules  of origin hampered  ACP  exports  of manufactures?  They 
require,  for  example,  that  50%  of  the value  of  the parts  or  components  used 
in the manufacture  of  a  given  product be of  ACP  (or EEC)  origin if the 
finished  product  is  to  qualify for  duty-free  entry.  This  clearly 1s  a  very 
high figure,  given  the handicaps  many  ACP  countries  face  in their efforts at 
industrialization.  The  Community  has maintained  that a  lower  figure  would 
attract footlose  companies,  especially  the multinationals  from outside  the 
EEC.  They  would  limit  their operations  to  simple  assembly of  imported 
components  or  even  packaging  and  labelling of  finished  products,  in order  to 
take  advantage  of duty-free entry into  the  EEC. 
The  50%  rule  clearly has  obliged manufacturers  to  be more  innovative.  Thus 
a  Jamaican  firm is making  work  clothes  from  fabrics  imported  from  the  Ivory 
Coast  and  Scottish wool  is being converted  into  sweaters  in Mauritius.  But 
to  the  extent  that  the  rules of origin are  hampering  industrial ventures, -~-
the  EEC  has  not only  simplified  them  under  Lome  III but also  improved  the 
derogation system  (under which  the  50%  criterion can be waived)  and  elimi-
nated it altogether  for  several products  of export interest to  the ACP 
countries. -47-
RULES  OF  ORIGIN 
The  Lome  Convention,  the Mediterranean  agreements,  the Generalized System 
of Preferences all provide  for preferential  - which  often means duty-free -
entry into  the  EEC  of the exports of the ACP,  Mediterranean  and other 
developing countries.  But in order  to qualify  for  such preferential  treat-
ment  the products  must  "originate"  in  the exporting country. 
A  shirt made  in Egypt  from  locally produced cloth,  which itself was  woven 
from  yarn  spun  from  Egyptian  cotton,  clearly is of Egyptian  origin.  But 
if Sri  Lanka  were  to  make shirts  from  Egyptian cloth  would  they be of Sri 
Lankan  origin?  And if Madagascar  re-packaged shirts imported  from  Hong 
Kong,  would the EEC  accept  them as originating in Madagascar? 
But  why  should it matter on  the  EEC  whether shirts exported by  Madagascar 
are  made  locally?  It matters because  the  Community's  purpose in  granting 
preferential entry to developing countries is to help  them industrialize. 
And  clearly simply  repackaging  goods  made  elsewhere,  mixing products  and 
assembling components hardly qualify as industrial activities.  on  the 
contrary,  they  can  result  in  trade deflection,  as  when  a  South  Korean 
television manufacturer ships his sets  to  an  ACP  country  for repackaging 
and  re-export  to  the  EEC. 
Of course  very  few  developing countries are  in  a  position  to produce all 
the necessary inputs  themselves;  some  at least must be imported.  The 
EEC's  rules of origin allow the  use of imported material,  provided it does 
not exceed  40%  to  50%  of the  value of the  finished product.  Thus if its 
value is $100,  inputs worth  up  to  $40  (or  $50)  can  be  used  from  a  non-
originating source. 
However,  in  order  to  encourage  trade  among  the ACP  countries,  the  Community 
allows  them  to  "cumulate" origin.  This  means  that  inputs  obtained in 
another ACP  country are  regarded as  "originating products",  so  that  the 
value  added  criteria mentioned earlier does  not apply.  Inputs bought in 
the  EEC  are also regarded as  "originating products".  Countries belonging 
to  the  two  regional  groupings,  ASEAN  and  the  Andean  Pact,  can  also  "cumu-
late" origin. -48-
The  trade provisions of  the  successive  Lome  Conventions  reflect  the  theories 
of export-led  growth  {plus  the  need  to  safeguard certain long-established 
trade  flows  between  individual  ACP  and  Community  countries).  But  given  the 
make-up  of  the  ACP  group,  and especially its high proportion of least 
developed countries,  the  Convention's  trade provisions  probably are  much 
less  important  than its provisions  for  development  aid. 
Any  assessment of it must  focus,  therefore,  on  these provisions  (stabiliza-
tion of export  earnings;  agricultural  cooperation;  rural  development; 
technical cooperation,  aid  to  small  and medium-sized  firms;  regional  coope-
ration,  etc.).  How  effective have  they  proved  in developing production  for 
domestic  consumption?  How  far has  the EEC's  financial  cooperation helped 
the  ACP  countries meet  the  foreign  exchange  costs  of  developing agricultural 
and  industrial production?  What  effect has  the  EEC's  technical  cooperation 
had  on  the  capacity of  individual  ACP  countries  to  take  control  of  their own 
economic  development? 
These  questions  lie outside  the  scope  of  this  paper.  As  regards  the  trade 
provisions  of  the  Lome  Convention,  they  do  not seem  to  have  led  to  a  signi-
ficant  increase in ACP  exports  to  the  Community  as  regards  primary products 
and  raw  materials  (which still account  for  some  90%  of  their exports). 
Nor  are  the  results more  encouraging  as  regards  manufactures.  The  share  of 
individual  ACP  countries  in the EEC's  imports  of  Third World Manufactures 
remains  either small  or negligible.  But it is just possible  that without 
the Yaounde and Lome  Conventions  their situation might have been  even  less 
favourable  vis-a-vis other  developing  countries. 
THE  SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN  COUNTRIES 
The  seven countries of  the  Arab  Mashreq  and Maghreb  provide an  acid test of 
the EEC's  willingness  to  develop  its imports  from  the  Third World,  especial-
ly of manufactured  goods.  Greece  and Italy are closer physically and, 
perhaps  in  temperament  also  to  their neighbours  across  the  sea  than  to  their 
partners  in Northern Europe.  With  the entry of  Spain and Portugal,  the 
EEC's  Mediterranean  character will become  even  stronger. 
The  cooperation agreements  with  the  seven Mashreq  and  Maghreb  countries only 
confirm  the  Community's  Mediterranean  vocation~  But have  these  agreements 
drawn  the  two  sides  closer  together as  regards  their trade?  Actually  a -~-
high proportion of  the  exports  of  the  seven Arab  states consist of  raw mate-
rials which would enter  the  EEC  duty-free  anyway.  They  include oil  and  gas 
from Algeria,  phosphates  from  Morocco  and  cotton  from Egypt  and  Syria.  In 
fact  some  95%  of Algerian exports  to  the  EEC  are  made  up  of  crude  oil  and 
natural  gas;  they  account  for  around  50%  of  the  total exports  of  the  seven 
southern  Mediterranean  countries. 
The  fact  that  raw materials still account  for  such  a  large part of  their 
exports  suggests  that  the  prospects of  duty-free access  has  not  stimulated 
investors  to  process  these  raw materials  locally.  But Egypt's  attempts  to 
transform its  raw  cotton  into  yarn  and  fabrics,  for  example,  have  been 
hampered by  the  import  restraints  introduced by  the EEC.  Tunisian  and 
Moroccan efforts  to build  up  a  garment  industry have  also  led  to  the  intro-
duction of  import  quotas. 
Although  the  cooperation agreements  rule  out  the  use  of  quotas  the EEC,  under 
pressure  from its textile  lobbies,  persuaded Tunisia  and  Morocco  to  accept 
voluntary export restraints.  The  measure,  it noted,  would be  temporary  and 
ensured  that  the  safeguard  clause  would  not be  invoked.  However,  it almost 
certainly would have  been  in Tunisian and  Moroccan  interests  that  the  EEC 
invoke it,  for it would  have  been obliged  to  provide  firm evidence  that 
imports  from  these  two  countries were  directly responsible  for  the  crisis ih 
the European  textile industry. 
The  Community's  textile  imports  from Egypt,  Tunisia and  Morocco  have  conti-
nued  to  rise,  however,  despite  the  introduction of  import  ceilings.  Certain-
ly  imports  from  the Mediterranean countries have  been much  less  severely 
restricted  than  imports  from  the  Far East,  for  example.  This  suggests, 
therefore,  that  the  rise in  the  exports  of  the  Mediterranean  countries has 
been at  the  expense  of other developing  countries. 
The  effect of  the  quotas  is  to  penalize  the  southern Mediterranean  countries 
for having  a  comparative  advantage  in labour costs.  The  same  situation 
exists  as  regards  their exports  of  processed agricultural products.  Here 
their comparative  advantage  extends  to  local  production  of  the  raw materials, 
and  the  penalty consists  in tariff concessions being made  conditional  on 
sales  taking place at certain  times  of  the year only or at minimum  prices  f9r 
fixed  quantities. -50-
Of  course  the Mediterranean regions  of  the  10-nation EEC  are  facing diffi-
culties as  regards  the  disposal,  on  the  open market,  of  their own  production 
of  citrus  fruit,  wine,  olive oil, etc.  Their problems will increase with 
the  entry of  Spain  and Portugal  into  the  Community.  The  12-nation EEC  is 
likely  to  have  a  substantial surplus of olive oil,  a  major Tunisian export, 
and  to  depend  far  less  on  imports  of  citrus fruit,  an  important export  item 
for  Morocco.  Unfortunately  there is only  a  limited export market  for  Medi-
terranean products  outside  the EEC. 
But  there  are  two  major  economic  reasons  why  the  seven Mashreq  and  Maghreb 
countries  deserve better treatment at the hands  of the Community.  They 
account  for  a  small  share  of  the  Community's  total  imports  from all develop-
ing countries,  In 1983  their share was  under  12%  if Algerian  and  Egyptian 
oil and  gas  exports  are  included; without  them,  their share was  a  mere  3%. 
However,  the  Community  is  a  major  market  for  all seven countries,  taking 
between  35%  to  60%  of  the  total exports  of each. 
The  second  reason is  the  growing deficit which  the Mashreq  and Maghreb  coun-
tries  (with  the  exception of Algeria)  face  in their  trade with  the  EEC.  In 
1983  their combined  deficit amounted  to  ECU  5,220 million.  This  sum  was 
equal  to  some  135%  of  their  combined non-oil exports  to  the  Community. 
THE  "NON-ASSOCIATED"  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
The  "non-associated" developing countries  fom a  very  large and  very hetero-
genous  group.  Although  dominated by  the oil exporting countries,  the  group 
also  includes  the  newly  industrializing countries  (NICs)  as well  as  the least 
developed,  In this  respect it is akin  to  the  ACP  group,  and  assessing  the 
effectiveness  of EEC  policies poses  roughly  the  same  problems  as  in  the  case 
of  the  ACP  group. 
The  two  main  trade policy  instruments  are  (1)  the  GSP  and  (2)  the various 
economic  and  commercial  cooperation agreements.  A third is represented by 
the bilateral agreements  concluded by  the  EEC  with over a  score  of  "non-
associated"  developing countries but  under  the  GATT  Multifibres Arrangement 
(MFA),  which  in  theory  expires  in July  1986.  (From a  strictly, legal point 
of  view  the ACP  countries also  are beneficiaries of  the  GSP.  They  make  no 
use of it, however,  as  they  enjoy more  generous  tariff preferences  under  the 
Lome  Convention.) -51-
In  1983  the exports  of  the  "non-associated" countries  (essentially  from 
Latin America,  Asia  and  the  Middle East)  amounted  to  some  ECU  80  billion,  as 
compared  to  ECU  22  billion in 1973.  Although  this  represents  an  increase of 
some  250%,  their share  of EEC  imports  from all developing countries was 
around  66%  in both  these years.  Over  this  same  period  the Asian countries 
saw  their exports  rise by  365%,  the Latin American by  273%  and  the  countries 
of  the Middle  East by  206%.  (The  ACP  countries  saw  their exports  rise by 
220%  during  this period.) 
THE  GSP 
How  much  of  this  increase was  due  to  the GSP?  It is  not  easy  to  isolate 
the effects of  the  GSP  on  the  Community's  imports  from  the non-associated 
developing countries.  It must  be  remembered  that a  substantial part of 
their exports  are  not subject  to  tariffs  anyway;  and  that  during  the early 
years  of  the  GSP  most beneficiary countries were  trying  to  master  its com-
plexities  (when  they were  not indifferent  to it altogether,  having  few,  if 
any,  semi-manufactured  and manufactured products  for export). 
In 1978  GSP  imports  amounted  to  3.6 billion ECUs,  a  figure  which  had  risen 
to  ECU  8.8 billion in 1982  but fell slightly in 1983  to  ECU  8.6 billion. 
The  increase between  1978  and  1982  was  145%;  the  2%  decline  in  1983 was  due 
to  a  drop  in  imports  of  refined petroleum products which,  incidentally,  are 
an  important  item.  The  bulk of  GSP  imports  from  Venezuela  and  Saudi  Arabia, 
for  example,  consist of  such  products.  But it is  the policy of  the oil 
companies  rather  than  the  GSP  scheme  which  is  the  decisive  factor here. 
In  1983  GSP  imports  accounted  for  roughly one-third of  imports  eligible  for 
GSP  treatment.  This  seems  a  relatively  low  figure  but it must  be  remembered 
that  GSP  quotas  and  ceilings are  seldom fully utilized.  In  1983  these 
together  amounted  to  ECU  16.8 billion,  of which  just over  50%  were  utilized, 
Of  course certain GSP  quotas  and  ceilings  are better utilized  than others. 
In  1983  textile  quotas  were  under-utilized by  some  30%  whereas  textile 
ceilings  (which  are  simply kept  under surveillance)  were  exceeded by  30%. 
GSP  textile  imports  in fact  represented  11%  of  total  GSP  imports  in 1983. 
How  far has  the  GSP  furthered  the  initial objective of helping developing 
countries  increase  their exports  of manufactured  goods  and,  by  the  same 
token,  become  more  industrialized?  The  list of  the major beneficiary -52-
countries offers  an  indirect answer  to  this question.  From  the beginning 
a  large part of  the  GSP  benefits has  gone  to  roughly  the  same  dozen or so 
countries  (whose  names  appear at the  top  of  the list of beneficiaries  for 
every  GSP  scheme). 
Many  of  them  are  newly  industrializing countries;  together  they have  accounted 
for  as  much  as  two-thirds  of all GSP  imports.  Another  important  group  has 
consisted of  middle  income  countries  in Asia and Latin America.  However, 
the list of  the major  GSP  beneficiaries has  undergone  changes  in the last  two 
or  three  years.  While  Brazil has  more  than held its own,  other Latin 
American  countries have  slipped back,  while  the Asian  countries have  moved 
ahead.  They  include India,  South Korea  and Hong  Kong  as  well  as  Malaysia 
and  Singapore. 
with  them. 
A  recent beneficiary,  China,  seems  intent on  catching  up 
A few  of  the least developed  countries,  notably Bangladesh  and  South Yemen 
(petroleum products),  are beginning  to  take  advantage of  the  GSP.  In  the 
last 2  or  3  years  their GSP  exports have  increased by  some  two-thirds 
{admittedly  from  a  very  low base).  This  suggests  that  the  Community's 
decision  to  relax all the  rules  in  their favour  (including  the rules of 
origin)  is beginning  to bear fruit.  Even  so,  the major beneficiaries of its 
GSP  scheme  (like  those of  the  other  industrialized countries)  are  the coun-
tries which had  an  industrial base  and were  exporting manufactured  goods 
already.  The  GSP  has  helped  them build up  their exports  faster  and  diversify 
the  range  of  their exports.  With  some  exceptions, it has  had  very little 
effect on either  the exports  or  the  level of industrialization of  the  less 
advanced  countries. 
There  are  a  number  of  reasons  for  this.  The  most  important,  perhaps,  has  to 
do  with  the  nature  of  the GSP.  Developing countries  tend  to  think of it as 
an  instrument of  development  aid; it is  in fact a  trade  concession,  What 
the  GSP  does  is  give  Third World  exporters  a  certain edge  in their negotia-
tions with  importers.  But  they must first find  a  buyer. 
The  Community  market is both  demanding  and  attractive.  It is  therefore a 
difficult as  well  as  a  highly competitive market.  As  the EEC  forms  a  free 
trade  area with  the  other West  European  countries,  its GSP  scheme  confers  no 
advantage  to  Third World  exporters vis-a-vis  these countries which,  never-
theless,  account  for  25%  of  the  Community  market.  The  countries  against -53-
which  it gives  them  a  competitive  edge  are  the  United States  and  Japan! 
THE  COMMERCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  COOPERATION  AGREEMENTS 
As  for  the  economic  and  commercial  cooperation agreements,  their effect on 
exports  is  even more  difficult  to assess,  even  though  the  number  of countries 
with whom  the  EEC  has  concluded  such  agreements  is very small  and only in  the 
case  of  the  four  South Asian  countries  have  the  agreements  been in operation 
for  any  length of  time.  It must  be  remembered  that  the non-preferential 
cooperation agreements  try  to  generate more  trade  through  changes  in the 
pattern of  industrial production,  especially in  the  developing  countries. 
The  various  agreements  assume  that  in order  to bring  about  such  changes  the 
developing countries need  new  technologies,  more  R & D,  fresh  foreign invest-
ments,  better marketing  techniques,  etc.  Tbe  emphasis  in  these  agreements, 
therefore,  is  on  cooperation between  those  in  the EEC  who  have  this  technolo-
gy,  capital,  marketing skills and  other modern  inputs  and  their Indian or 
Brazilian or  Chinese  counterparts. 
Tbe  effectiveness of  the non-preferential cooperation agreements will be 
reflected,  therefore,  in  increased  transfers  of  technology;  more  direct 
European  investments,  through  joint ventures,  for example;  agreements  for  the 
promotion  and protection of  foreign  investments;  agreements  on  the avoidanle 
of  double  taxation,  etc. 
Tbe  experience  of  the  ASEAN  countries,  which  have  been quick  to  absorb 
investments  and  technology  from not only  the  EEC  but also Japan  and  the 
United States,  suggests  that  the  underlying  assumption  of  these  cooperation 
agreements  is a  sound  one.  Tbe  1984  EEC/ASEAN  ministerial meeting  in 
Dublin concluded  that  the  1980  agreement  ·~ad fulfilled satisfactorily its 
role ...  "  Tbere  had been a  substantive  increase in EEC/ASEAN  trade,  the 
proportion of  manufactured  goods  in ASEAN  exports had  continued  to  rise,  as 
had  the  level  of European  investments  in ASEAN. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Tbe  10-nation EEC  is a  major economic  and  trading power.  With  per capita 
imports  of  $1,080  (in 1983)  it is essentially an  open market:  countries with 
a  relatively high  per capita value  of  imports  tend  to  apply  relatively  low 
tariff rates,  as  a  recent  UNCTAD  report noted.  Tbe  EEC's  average  tariff, 
on  the CIF  value  of  its total imports,  including  those at zero  duty,  is  1% -~-
(as  compared  to  2.9%  for Japan  and  3.5%  for  the United States).  According 
to  an  IMF  study,  the  import duties levied by  the  Community  represented 0.4% 
of  central  government  revenues  in 1979  (as  compared  to  1.7%  for all  developed 
market-economies  and  1.6%  for  the u.s.). 
The  10-nation EEC  is also  a  major market  for  the  exports of  developing  coun-
tries.  Per capita imports  from  the  Third World  amounted  to  $410  (as against 
$580  for  Japan  and  $460  for  the U.S.).  From  the beginning  the  EEC  has 
recognized  that  trade can make  an  important contribution to  the  economic 
growth  and  development  of  the  Third World  also.  It has  responded  by  (1) 
keeping  the  Community  market  as  open  to  imports  from  developing countries  as 
possible  and  (2)  actively promoting both  imports  and  the  investments  and 
technology  transfers  developing countries  need if they are  to  compete  success-
fully on European markets.  What  is more,  it has  developed  a  wide  range  of 
instruments  to achieve  these ends. 
The  earliest of  these were  preferential  arrangements,  such  as  the Yaounde 
Convention.  Under  these agreements  the  free  access  which  individual  deve-
loping countries had  traditionally enjoyed  to  one  EEC  member  state were  made 
available in all Six and currently in all Ten.  But  since  1959  the  Community 
has  also sought  to  reduce  gradually the preferential margins  - i.e.  the 
difference between  the preferential  and  the most-favoured-nation rates of 
duty.  This  difference,  which was  originally  16%  in the case of  unroasted 
coffee,  for  example,  is  now  5%.  And  since 1971  most of the  zero or  low 
rates  of  duty  applied  under  the preferential agreements  have  been made  avail-
able  to all  developing countries. TARIFF  PROTECTION  IN  THE  EEC,  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 
Tariffs on  representative  items  ++ 
Product  EEC  u.s.  JAPAN 
Coffee  (unroasted)  5%  Free  Free 
Coffee  - instant  18%  Free  19.4% 
Shirts  (men's,  boys')  13.7%  21%  or  12.1% 
36.3% 
Shoes  (leather)  8%  Varies  from  17(.  27% 
a  pair  to  17% 
Hand  tools  4.8%  1.5%  to  8%  4.2% 
Plywood  10.4%  4. 7%  to  20%  17.5% 
++Rates notified  to  GATT  and  in force  as  follows:  EEC- 1985;  U.S.- 1984;  Japan- 1985  (Jan-Mar). 
These  tariffs are waived  or  reduced for  imports  from countries  that enjoy preferential  treatment, 
e.g.  the  65  ACP  countries  under  the EEC-ACP  Lome  Convention,  and  all developing  countries  under 
the GSP. 
Source:  Customs  Tariffs. 
I  "'  "' -~-
(Between  1978  and  1983  GSP  imports  rose  twice  as  fast  as  total  imports  from 
the  developing countries). 
Although it has  been  the  subject of much  criticism by  the  developing  coun-
tries,  the  Community's  GSP  scheme  is  exemplary  on  at  least  two  accounts: 
(1)  it covers all industrial products,  including highly sensitive ones  like 
textiles,  clothing and  footwear  and  (2)  its benefits are available  to all 
developing countries.  Equally noteworthy  is  the  fact  that no  country has 
had  GSP  benefits withdrawn on  the  grounds  that it had become  too  competitive; 
in  a  limited number  of  cases  the  more  competitive  countries  have had  their 
quotas  frozen  for specific products. 
The  one black spot in an otherwise relatively bright picture  is  provided by 
textiles and  clothing.  According  to  an  UNCTAD  report  volume  and price re-
straints affect as  much  as  80%  of  the EEC's  imports  of  textiles  and  textile 
articles,  as  compared  to  45%  for all developed market-economy  countries, 
25%  for  the  United  States  and  8%  for  Japan.  These restraints,  essentially 
non-tariff barriers,  include  tariff- and  other  quotas,  control  of  the mini-
mum  price  level,  etc.  It should be  pointed out  that many  of  them  apply  to 
imports  from Eastern Europe.  Restraints,  essentially quotas,  affecting 
imports  from Asian and Latin American countries  are  applied  under  the  Gatt 
Multifibres Arrangement  (MFA). 
But  the  restraints must  be  seen against  the background of  the situation 
within  the EEC's  own  textile and clothing  industries.  In recent years 
production of both  textiles and  clothing has  fallen below  the  levels  reached 
in 1975,  and  any  sustained recovery is ruled out for  the present.  Employ-
ment,  too,  has  fallen,  by  some  40%  between  1973  and  1983. 
Despite  the virtual stagnation of internal demand  for  textiles  (it has  risen 
1%  a  year  since  1975),  imports  over  the  same  period have  increased by  115%. 
Unlike  the  United  States  and  Japan,  the  Community  imports  large quantities 
of both  textiles  and clothing  from  the Mediterranean countries as well  as 
Eastern Europe;  in fact  a  considerable  proportion of Japanese  fabric  exports 
to  Asia  end  up  in  the  EEC  as  finished products.  If  the  imports  from 
developing countries  are  viewed  on  a  per capita basis,  the EEC  leads with  $51, 
followed  by  the United States with  $36  and  Japan with  $16  (1983  figures). -57-
Textiles apart,  the  restrictions  imposed by  the  EEC  on  imports  from develop-
ing  countries are relatively  few.  In a  number  of  cases  the  EEC  has  obtained 
voluntary export  restraints  for  specific products  from  certain "non-associa-
ted"  developing countries  as,  for  example,  steel  from  South Korea  and Brazil. 
Some  countries with  preferential agreements,  such  as  Tunisia and Morocco, 
have been obliged  to  accept voluntary  export restraints also,  usually on 
textiles and  clothing.  And  the  Community  has  been less  generous  than  the 
developing countries had hoped  as  regards  its generalized system of prefe-
rences  (GSP). 
But  if the EEC's  trade  policies are  not  as  restrictive,  on  the whole,  as  its 
critics maintain,  their  implementation  can  - and  does  - create  uncertainty 
in  the  minds  of  Third World exporters,  who  claim they never  know  when  the 
Community  may  restrict imports  of  a  given product.  The  uncertainty is all 
the  greater as  the  restrictions  invariably are  selective  as  to products  and 
countries.  On  the  other hand,  not even countries with preferential agree-
ments  are  entirely safe  from  such  selective action. 
Paradoxically,  some  of  this  uncertainty  stems  from  the  EEC's  desire  to 
implement its trade  policies as  liberally as  possible.  Although all  GSP 
imports  are  subject  to  quotas  or  ceilings,  many  of  the  latter are  "notional" 
in  the  sense  that  in many  cases  no  action may  be  taken  even after  the 
ceiling has been  substantially exceeded.  This  can  lead exporters  to  assume 
the  ceiling  to  be non-existent,  until  the  day  the  decision  is  taken  to halt 
further  GSP  imports  of  the  product  in question until  the  following  year. 
The  fact  that  the  single internal market  promised by  the Treaty of  Rome  has 
yet  to materialize can also  create uncertainty for exporters.  In principle, 
once  goods  have  cleared customs  at any  EEC  point of entry  they  can be  moved 
freely within  the  Community.  In practice,  however,  this is not always 
possible.  Under  the bilateral  textile agreements  import quotas  are distri-
buted  among  the member  states,  so  that in practice a  state can block  imports 
once  its quota has  been fully  utilized by  the  textile exporting country. 
To  the  extent  that  the  quotas  are  published in  the EEC's  Official  Journal  such 
stoppages  can be  foreseen  by  the well-informed exporter.  However,  a  member 
state can also  invoke Article  115,  under which  goods  in free  circulation 
within  the  Community  can be  kept  out of a  member  state  to  avoid economic 
difficulties  for  it. -58-
The  uncertainty which  the  threat of  restrictive action can  give rise  to  is 
likely  to  discourage  the  potential exporter as  well  as  the private investor. 
The  uncertainty  is  greatest no  doubt  for industries  such  as  textiles,  clothing 
and  footwear.  It can be  argued  that well-established textile exporting 
countries,  such as  Hong  Kong  or India,  should  recognize  that  they have 
acquired a  "fair" share  of  the  EEC  market  and  diversify  into other lines. 
The  fact  is  that as  the  developing countries have  established new  lines  they 
have  found  their exports  threatened by restrictive action once  they become 
competitive.  The  recent,  and  admittedly  rapid,  expansion of  the petroleum 
and  petrochemical  industries  in  the  countries of  the Arabian Gulf has  already 
led  the  Community  to envisage  the possibility of  taking restrictive measures 
against  the  GSP  exports of  these countries,  perhaps  as  a  prelude  to  a  self-
restraint  agreement. 
Developing countries accept  the  need  for a  safeguard  clause,  but  to  avoid 
abuse  they maintain its application should be  non-discriminatory  rather  than 
selective and  should be  justified.  In fact most  of  them believe  safeguard 
action should be  taken,  if at all,  under Article  19  of  the  Gatt  (which provi-
des  for  non-discriminatory action and  compensation).  In recent years  the 
EEC  has  taken  the attitude  that where  restrictive action is  taken on politi-
cal  or social grounds  - for  example,  to  prevent a  further  rise in unemploy-
ment  imports  from  any  developing  country  can be  restricted.  In 1984  quotas 
were  imposed on shirts exported  from Bangladesh  to  the  U.K.  and  France, 
pending consultations,  although Bangladesh is both  a  newcomer  to  the textile 
trade  and  a  least  developed  country  and entitled  to  more  favourable  treatment 
on  both scores. 
It is the EEC's  handling of  cases  such  as  that of Bangladesh which  confirms 
developing countries  in  their belief  that  the  Community  is protectionist, 
especially when  it comes  to  their exports.  But accusations of protectionism 
are  often launched by countries which are  unable  to  compete  successfully on 
the  EEC  market.  Exporting  to  any market is a  difficult business at  the best 
of  times.  If European  firms  seem much  more  successful at it the  reasons 
are  not  far  to  seek:  a  high proportion of  their exports  are  (1)  within  the 
frontiers  of  the  EEC  or to  other European countries  and  (2)  between related 
parties  (i.e.  intra-firm trade). 
Provided  a  developing  country has  the skills needed  to  produce  goods  to  the 
requirements  of  the  EEC  market  and  to  market  them effectively, it will  find -59-
the  Community  as  open  a  market  as  any  other.  The  experience  of  the  ASEAN 
countries bears  this  out.  Between  1978  and  1983  their exports of agricul-
tural products  rose by  50%,  as  compared  to  an increase of  34%  recorded by 
all  third countries  during  this period.  As  regards  manufactured products, 
between  1973  and  1983  the proportion exported by  ASEAN  rose  from  25%  of their 
total exports  to  42%.  In 1973  they  represented 0.1%  of  the EEC's  domestic 
consumption of  manufactured  goods;  by  1983  they  represented 0.4%  of  a  much 
higher  level of  consumption. 
Given  the  much  greater American  and  Japanese business  presence  in ASEAN  one 
would expect its trade  to  be  directed mainly  toward  these countries.  This 
is  the case in general.  However,  between  1973  and  1983  the EEC's  imports 
of manufactured  products  from  ASEAN  rose by  642%.  This  was  somewhat  below 
the  corresponding  figure  for  the  United  States  - 700%  - but well  above  that 
for  Japan  - 312%.  Even  as  regards  textiles  and  clothing,  the EEC  was  the 
major market  for  ASEAN  exporters  in 1980  and  1981,  taking between  27%  to 
30%  of  the  total,  as  compared  to  22%  for  the  United  States  and  4%  for  Japan. 
In fact  the  annual  growth  rate of  the  Community's  textile  and  clothing  imports 
from  ASEAN  was  16%  between  1977  and  1983. 
The  rapid  growth  of certain imports  from ASEAN,  especially of manufactured 
goods,  has  led  to  concern  in  some  EEC  countries.  Some  five years  ago  the 
then Foreign Minister of Singapore  suggested,  during  an EEC/ASEAN  ministerial 
level  conference  in Brussels,  that  the  two  sides  should  consult  each other 
regularly on  their changing  industrial structures.  Implicit in the  sugges-
tion was  the belief that  the  industrialized countries  have  "outgrown"  a 
certain number  of  industries,  because  they  are  labour  intensive  - or  even 
because  they  pollute  the  environment. 
It is clear  that many  developing  countries would  like  the  EEC  to  join with 
them  in a  concerted  attempt  to  change  the pattern of  industrial production 
on both sides  on  the basis of  a  new  international division of  labour.  While 
the  concept of  declining  industries  is less  readily accepted by  industria-
lized countries  today  - Community  officials have  argued  there  are  no  decli-
ning  industries,  only  industries  awaiting  a  fresh  transfusion of  technology  -
the  EEC  is prepared  to  encourage  European  firms  to  collaborate with  firms  in 
developing  countries  through  the  transfer of  technology  and  capital. -60-
All  the cooperation agreements  in fact provide  for  industrial cooperation. 
The  most  detailed provisions are  to be  found  in  the  successive  Lome  Conven-
tions.  To  encourage  EEC  firms  to  invest in the ACP  countries  the  Community 
can subscribe  to  the  share capital of joint ventures with  funds  provided by 
the European  Development  Fund.  The  EEC  also maintains  a  Centre  for Indus-
trial Development  in Brussels,  which  seeks  to  bring together European and 
ACP  firms. 
The  cooperation agreements with  the  "non-associated"  countries  are  not as 
detailed.  The  EEC  has  so  far limited its activities  to organizing indus-
trial and  business  seminars  to  which European as well  as  Third World  firms 
are  invited.  However,  before  small  and medium-sized enterprises  from  the 
EEC  can venture  into Asia and  Latin America  they may  have  to  be helped in 
much  the  same  way  as  provided  for by  the  Lome  Convention.  Experience 
suggests  that industrial  cooperation,  in the widest  sense of  the  term,  is 
effective means  both of  industrializing developing countries  and  helping 
them  develop  their  trade with not only  the  EEC  and  other industrialized 
countries but also among  themselves, 
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